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INTRODUCTION
Planes to Tehran are no longer only filled with Iranian
expatriates, adventurous tourists, or curious journalists. As Jack
Straw, former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom keenly
observed, the planes are now becoming filled with businessmen
looking for investment opportunities.1 The revival of interest in doing
business with Iran came after a historic deal was reached between
Iran and five permanent members of the Security Council plus
Germany.2 In a nutshell, the deal offered a joint plan of action in
which Iran pledged to reduce its nuclear enrichment activity in return
for an ease of economic sanctions. As a first step, Iran suspended its
advanced uranium-fuel enrichment and Western countries released
some of its blocked assets.3 The business community welcomed the
deal, since Iran is a country with vast natural resources and economic
opportunities. By some accounts, Iran has the largest reserve of gas
and oil combined.4
The positive reaction of the business community raised a red flag
for the United States. Following a visit to Iran by a trade delegation
from France representing 100 French companies, Secretary John
Kerry had to call his French counterpart to explain that the sanction
regime is still in place.5 This was followed by a strong warning by
President Obama, reminding that the United States will go after
violators of Iran sanctions.6 Despite this, the Iranian President, Hassan

1. Jack Straw, Jack Straw: In Hassan Rouhani’s Iran, You Can Feel the Winds of
Change, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/jackstraw-in-hasan-rouhanis-iran-you-can-feel-the-winds-of-change-9068260.html.
2. Anne Gearin & Joby Warrick, Iran, World Powers Reach Historic Nuclear Deal,
WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/
53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html.
3. Rick Gladstone & Thomas Erdbrink, Temporary Nuclear Deal with Iran Take Effect,
THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/world/middleeast/
iran.html.
4. See BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, BP (June 2013), available at
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_
energy_2013.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
5. Kim Willsher & Saeed Kamali Dehghan, US Warns France Against Business with
Iran After Trade Trip to Tehran, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/feb/05/us-warns-france-business-iran-trade-tehran
6. Jeff Mason & Steve Holland, Obama says U.S. will deal harshly with violators of Iran
sanctions, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-usa-iranidUSBREA1A2B920140211.
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Rouhani, shows determination to break the economic sanctions
regime.7
Iran has faced an unprecedented web of economic sanctions in
the history of international relations, a complex regime consisting of
UN, US, and EU sanctions. Less widely known, Iran has concluded a
multitude of investment treaties aiming to promote and protect
foreign investment. Amidst the enthusiasm for investing in Iran,8
companies remained baffled as to the legal analyses and
consequences of their potential investment in Iran. In fact, Iran’s
investment case has posed unprecedented problems arising from the
interplay between at least three legal regimes: Iran’s domestic
investment regulations, economic sanction regime, and international
investment regime. The problem of investment in Iran is a paramount
example of a fragmented feature of today’s international law with
conflicting regimes at play.9 This Article is a first attempt to place the
clash between sanctions and investment regimes under scrutiny
employing Iran as a case study. In doing so, this Article portrays a
holistic and analytic picture of investment in Iran, its history,
trajectory, and current status.
Following the recent deal, Iran’s bilateral investment treaties and
foreign investment contracts have become ever the more important.
The recent escalation between Iran and the West under the
Ahmadinejad government that resulted in the aggravation of
economic sanctions was preceded by a period of reconciliation and
engagement in which mutual effort was set forth to construct a steady
economic relationship. The reconciliation efforts prompted a series of
bilateral as well as multilateral treaties and contracts. The legal and
policy consequences of these treaties and contracts, however, have
been often neglected in the subsequent time of sanctions and hostility.
Many companies ceased their operations in Iran, especially
subsequent to 2010 when economic sanctions started to show their
teeth. Despite the possibility of pursuing international law claims for
7. Iran must break chains of sanctions: Rouhani, TEHRAN TIMES (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://www.tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/94-headline/114345-iran-must-breakchain-of-sanctions-rouhani.
8. Matt Clinch, Iran: The next investment frontier?, MSN MONEY (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://money.msn.com/investing/iran-the-next-investment-frontier.
9. See generally International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,
A/CN.4./L.682 (Martti Koskenniemi ed.) (Apr. 13, 2006) (discussing the issue of
fragmentation in international law).
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compensation of losses caused by sanctions, Iran remained idle in
suing these companies for reasons that are unclear. One explanation
could be the lack of legal strategy from the Iranian side or fear of
counter legal measures from investors or states. In general, neither
side has paid enough attention to the treaties and contracts
incorporating arbitration clauses. Arbitration clauses in bilateral
investment treaties and investment contracts may be invoked at any
time for compensation and expropriation, which will result in almost
unprecedented international litigation. This will trigger new legal
challenges, which this Article aims to analyze.
Iran has always been one of the most important countries in
the Middle East in terms of foreign direct investment. A country with
a vast area of land and extremely rich natural resources undoubtedly
stands as a major target for foreign investment. As the history of
foreign investment shows, Iran has undergone ebbs and flows due to
its political and social situation. Some of the social and political
unrest, which has prompted major changes, has also been directly or
indirectly related to the issue of foreign investment. For instance, the
successful attempt to nationalize oil by Prime Minister Mosaddegh
was a reaction to several British oil concession contracts, which were
deemed unfair in the public mind of Iranians.10 Additionally, after the
Iranian Revolution in 1979, one of the main challenges was related to
the expropriation of foreign investment, which was eventually
addressed in the Algiers Accords. As a result, Iran became involved
in an unprecedented institutionalized legal dispute settlement
mechanism, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.
Following an eight-year war with Iraq, Iran decided to attract
foreign investment in order to rebuild and reconstruct its economy
and infrastructure. This dire need coincided with a surge of political
strength from reformists that culminated in the election of a reformist
president in 1997. In a period of expansion in foreign investment from
1995 to 2007, Iran drafted approximately 50 bilateral investment
treaties (“BIT”) with both developed and developing countries.
Through this, Iran signaled its determination to attract foreign
investment from developed countries. In addition, Iran hoped to
prevent and undermine the effects of international sanctions with the
help of its bilateral treaties with various countries.
10. MOSTAFA ELM, OIL, POWER, AND PRINCIPLE: IRAN’S OIL NATIONALIZATION AND
ITS AFTERMATH 81-182 (1992). The Oil Nationalization Act was passed by the Iranian
Parliament in 1951. Id.
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In particular, there are three legal issues, which pose almost
unprecedented challenges in international law and international
arbitration. Firstly, the Iranian Constitution and some of its internal
laws impose some restrictions as to the authority of the executive
branch to conclude international treaties.11 This may complicate the
enforcement of BITs in the case of disputes. Secondly, investors may
invoke both international and national sanctions as an excuse for the
breach of investment contracts. Thirdly, the issue is whether arbitral
tribunals hold any reviewability power when dealing with
international sanctions. This Article parses different aspects of
international sanctions in the context of investment disputes and
analyzes different scenarios in which international sanctions enter into
the scene of international arbitration.
This Article is divided into three main sections. In the first
section, a brief background of investment disputes and laws in Iran is
presented. In the subsequent section, Iran’s bilateral investment
treaties are analyzed. Lastly, the effect of international sanctions in
investment disputes is discussed. With the new dynamics resulting
from the rapprochement of Iran and Western Countries on the one
hand, and crippling sanctions on the other hand, the regime governing
investment in Iran is more important—yet more challenging—than
ever.
I. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN IRAN
A. A Brief History
1. The Case of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
Iran, called Persia at the time, was subject to one of the earliest
and most important investments in the modern era. In 1901, an
agreement was reached between Royal Persia and a British investor
named William Knox D’Arcy. This was a concession of several
special rights concerning oil including exploration, exploitation,
transport, and sales of gas and oil products. The concession was for
60 years with the obligation that the Persian government would
11. Farshad Ghodoosi, Comprehensive Solution to an Agreement: How the New Iran
Deal is Framed under Iranian Law?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 22, 2014), available at
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/22/guest-post-ghodoosi-comprehensive-solution-agreementnew-iran-deal-framed-iranian-law/. This was an issue in the recent deal concluded between
Iran and five plus one countries. Id.
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receive 16% of the profit as royalty. After a few years, D’Arcy
discovered oil in Persia and thus opened a new page in Iranian as well
as world history. In 1909, D’Arcy expanded his activities and a new
company emerged out of this concession agreement. In 1909, D’Arcy
and his co-workers incorporated the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,
which later became British Petroleum. This company was the first oil
company operating in the Middle East.
In 1907, Persia had been divided by two powerful countries at
the time. In an Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, the British took
control of the southern part of Iran while the Russians agreed to hold
influence in the northern part. The agreement stipulated a neutral zone
between the British and Russian spheres of influence.12 Four years
later, the British Government signed two agreements with Persia for
investment and administration because “the progress and property of
Persia should be promoted to the utmost.”13 These two agreements
instigated anger and criticism. For the administration, the British
Government supplied advisors with “adequate powers . . . at the cost
of Persian Government to be involved in contracts.”14 Regarding the
financial side of the property of Persia, the British Government
“offer[ed] to provide or arrange a substantial loan for the Persian
Government, for which adequate security shall be sought.” The
second agreement pertains to the loan of £2 million Pounds Sterling
by the British Government at the interest rate of 7%. Security of the
loans was mainly derived from the “revenues of the customs or other
sources of income at the disposal of the Persian Government.” Other
parts of the agreement deal with railway construction and other forms
of transportation.15 Although Iran was never legally a protectorate of
any country, some believe that the agreements of 1919 made Persia
“de facto under the virtual control of Great Britain for an indefinite
time to come.”16
The most important agreement regarding oil, however, dates
back to 1933 between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian
Government. The reason for the importance of this agreement is that
the dispute resulting from this agreement landed in the docket of the
12.
(1919).
13.
14.
15.
16.

Amos S. Hershey, The New Anglo-Persian Agreement, 13 AM. J. INT’L L. 749, 753
Id. at 749.
Id. at 749-50.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 753.
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International Court of Justice. Under this concession agreement, or
convention, the Anglo-Iranian Company was granted the exclusive
right to “search for and extract petroleum as well as to refine or treat
in any other manner and render suitable for commerce the petroleum
obtained by it.”17 The concession also included the transportation of
petroleum, its refinery and other measures to “render it suitable for
commerce” for sale whether inside or outside of Persia.18 Iran’s
government, in return, would receive four shillings per ton of
petroleum sold as an annual royalty in addition to 20% of either
dividends or reserves.19 The concession was, again, for sixty years
ending on December 31, 1993. This agreement could not be annulled
by the Iranian government, but incorporated an arbitration clause to
which it conferred the right of annulment under certain circumstances.
Article 22 stipulated an ad hoc arbitration body consisting of
three arbitrators, two of whom were to be selected by each party and
the third one by agreement of the two arbitrators. If the arbitrators
failed to reach a consensus apropos the third umpire, the President of
the Permanent Court of International Justice would appoint the third
arbitrator. Article 22 sets the scope of arbitration as well:
“Any differences between the parties of any nature whatever and
in particular any differences arising out of the interpretation of
this Agreement and of rights and obligations therein contained as
well as any differences of opinion which may rise relative to
questions for the settlement of which, by the terms of this
Agreement, the agreement of both parties is necessary, shall be
settled by arbitration.”20

The scope of the arbitration is wide and vague. Also, it requires
the ex post facto consent of parties to the arbitration. Article 26
stipulated that if the oil company failed to pay “any sum awarded” to
the Persian Government by the arbitration tribunal within a month
after the award, then it would declare the Concession annulled.21
This Concession, however, was not rendered annulled by an ad
hoc arbitration tribunal due to default or a similar incident. The
17. Revised Agreement: Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in THE MIDDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD: VOLUME 2:
BRITISH SUPREMACY 1914-45 (J.C. Hurewitz ed., 1979).
18. W.W. Bishop Jr., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 749, 750
(1951).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 751.
21. Id.
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Iranian Government unilaterally revoked the Agreement. In 1951, the
Iranian Parliament passed legislation on the nationalization of the oil
industry in Iran. The legislation demands that the “entire revenue
derived from oil and its products is indisputably due to the Persian
nation.”22 Iran rejected the request for arbitration on the grounds that
“the enforcement of the right of sovereignty of the Persian people, is
not subject to arbitration, and no international authority in qualified to
investigate this matter.”23 This denial led to a legal suit brought by the
United Kingdom to the International Court of Justice. In the famous
Anglo-Iranian oil case, the International Court of Justice accepted the
preliminary objection of the Iranian government based on
jurisdictional ground. The Court found no relevant treaty or
convention between the United Kingdom and Iran and consequently
“the court cannot derive jurisdiction in the present case from the
terms of the Declaration ratified by Iran on September 19, 1932.” The
United Kingdom tried to establish jurisdiction based on the Iranian
Declaration of Acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. In
this Declaration, Iran acceded to the International Court of Justice
jurisdiction “in regard to situations of facts relating directly or
indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions accepted by
Persia and the subsequent to the ratification of this Declaration.”24
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case posed a host of new
challenges for international law. The Court correctly declined to
recognize the concession agreement concluded between a private
company and Iran as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Yet,
interestingly enough, the Court did not enter into the international
legal status of expropriation and property rights of the investor. This
stirred a strong reaction from those who hoped the Court would
recognize the in rem right of the investor in the case.25 Reactions were

22. Id.
23. Id. at 752.
24. Charles G. Fenwick, The Order of the International Court of Justice in the AngloIranian Oil Company Case, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 723, 725-26 (1951). Some believe that the
conflict here is about grammatical versus logical interpretation: “grammatically, taken,
‘subsequent’ appears to relate to ‘treaties or conventions,’ which, if it were the correct
interpretation, would nullify the argument of Great Britain based upon the earlier agreement of
1928. The logical interpretation, however, is that the word ‘subsequent’ relates to ‘situations or
facts.’ This is assumed by Great Britain to be the correct interpretation and it is consistent with
the declaration made by a number of other states under Article 36 of the Statute.” See id.
25. D.P. O’Connell, A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation, 4 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 267,
268-69 (1955) (arguing “a concession may be regarded as analogous to an interested in land,
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centered on the idea that the individual right to property should be
respected vis-à-vis the sovereign right to natural resources.
Subsequent to the case, Iran negotiated with a consortium of
eight international oil companies, including Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company. The negations resulted in a new concession agreement on
September 19, 1954, in which Iran agreed to pay net sum of £25
million Pounds Sterling to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in ten
installments.26 Some scholars regard the new concession agreement as
evidence that Iran admitted the property right and other privileges of
the investors.27
B. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
One of the significant consequences of the resolution of the Iran
Hostage Crisis was the establishment of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.
This arbitral body has become a predecessor to the subsequent
investment arbitration tribunals, including the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). Its awards and
approaches to issues such as expropriation, nationality, and contracts
have been treated as authorities in later cases in NAFTA, ICSID, and
other tribunals. For instance, Gibson and Drahzol28 found that 17
ICSID arbitration awards have cited the Iran-US Claims Tribunal
awards amounting to 44.7% of all the awards on merits. In the case of
NAFTA, out of sixteen examples of awards, fourteen of them (87.5%)
cited precedents from the Iran-US Claims Tribunal whether on issues
related to merits or jurisdiction. Additionally, as some scholars
believe, the Tribunal set the stage for succeeding UN bodies such as
the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) or the
Claims Resolution Tribunal for Swiss Dormant Accounts.29 These
giving rise to rights in rem which cannot be unilaterally abrogated without importing an
obligation to pay compensation”).
26. Kenneth S. Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 AM. J. INT’L L.
260, 273-74 (1958); Abolbashar Farmanfarma, The Oil Agreement Between Iran and the
International Oil Consortium: the Law Controlling, 34 TEX. L. REV. 259, 261 (1955).
27. Id. at 274.
28. Christopher S. Gibson & Christopher R. Drahozal, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration, in THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25, THE
CASES EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE & INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
22-27 (2007).
29. David D. Caron & John R. Crook, Concluding Reflections, in THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION 369
(2000).
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clearly demonstrate the importance of one Iran-US Claims Tribunal
and its continuing impact on arbitration and investment law.
The Tribunal was established pursuant to the Algiers Accords.
The agreement was predicated on the release of the hostages who
were held in Iran for 444 days. The United States, in return, agreed to
return Iranian assets and withdraw from the prosecution of Iran in
international courts on this matter. Following the agreement, the
hostages were released and US$8.1 billion was transferred to an
escrow account. Out of US$2 billion of unfrozen Iranian assets, US$1
billion were also kept in a security account from which sums awarded
to US nationals by the Tribunal could be collected.30 The main
document establishing the Tribunal is the Claim Settlement
Declaration. Article II sets the scope of the Tribunal:
“1. An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding
claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of
nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim
which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that
constitutes the subject matter of that national’s claim, if such claims
and counterclaims are outstanding on the date of this Agreement,
whether or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, contracts
(including transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or
bank guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property
rights…
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims
of the United States and Iran against each other arising out of
contractual arrangements between them for the purchase and sale of
goods and services…
3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as specified in
Paragraphs 16-17 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of
January 19, 1981, over any dispute as to the interpretation or
performance of any provision of that Declaration.”31
The scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is rather broad. It
includes sales of goods and services, agency relationships, export and
import, expropriation and state responsibility, corporation-related
30. CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL 7-10 (1998).
31. Iran-United States Claims Settlement Declaration, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declar
ation.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
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matters and many more. In some areas, such as joint venture, the
Tribunal is the only international body that has systematically
analyzed the legal treatment of joint ventures.32 This broad
jurisdiction was accompanied by the application of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules.
Pursuant to Article III paragraph 2 “members of the tribunal shall be
appointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its business in accordance
with the arbitration rules of the UNCITRAL.”33 UNCITRAL rules
were adopted in 1976, and the enforcement of the rules in the Iran-US
Claims Tribunal was the first systematic use of them.34 This is another
important legacy of this Tribunal.
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal had an enormous impact on the
issue of investor-state arbitration. For instance, on the issue of
nationality and dual citizenship, it introduced the concept of dominant
nationality. In case number A18, the Tribunal held that “it has
jurisdiction over claims against Iran by dual Iran-United States
nationals when the dominant and effective nationality of the claimant
during the relevant period from the date the claim arose until 19
January 1981 was that of the United States.”35 As a result, it is the
country in which the national is actively engaged that determines the
effective nationality.
Another issue was expropriation. Arbitrators appointed by the
Iranian government were inclined to narrowly construe the term
expropriation to exclude shareholders and contractual rights. They
referred to the Treaty of Amity between Iran and United States
(1950). The Tribunal, however, concluded that expropriation should
be interpreted based on customary international law and not the
Treaty. Consequently, in the case of Amoco International Finance,
the Tribunal treated an investor, in the interest of the joint stock
company, as a property right, which became subject of Iran
expropriation. In the Mobile Oil Iran Case, the Tribunal also treated
take-away of contractual rights as expropriation.36 These are some

32. Daniel Barstow Magraw, The Tribunal in Jurisprudential Perspective, in THE IRANUNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY 23
(Richard B. Lillich et al. eds., 1998).
33. Iran-United States Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 31.
34. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 30 at 16-17.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Mark R. Joelson, The Contribution of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to the
International Law on Expropriation, in THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25, THE CASES
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instances of the importance of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in
international investment law and arbitration.
C. Recent Investment Disputes
It seems that there are no investment arbitration cases
involving the recent wave of conclusions of BITs by Iran. There have
been a few cases related to investment before the Revolution
involving arbitration. For instance, in National Iranian Oil Company
v. Ashland Oil Inc.,37 the respondent allegedly refused to pay the
crude oil it received due to possible turmoil following the Iranian
Revolution. Subsequently, the respondent did not participate in an
arbitration proceeding in Iran (the place of arbitration according to the
contract) due to the potential dangers for Americans. The National
Iranian Oil Company then sought to compel arbitration in Mississippi
arguing that commercial impracticability necessitated change of the
arbitration forum. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit declared that the
agreement to arbitrate is not severable from the contract and the court
cannot compel arbitration in another forum besides that which the
parties explicitly agreed.
In another case, Iran tried to compel arbitration in Delaware in
National Iranian Oil Co v. Mapco Int’l, Inc.38 In 1979, the National
Iranian Oil Company entered into a contract with Mapco International
for the sale of crude oil. According to the arbitration clause, laws of
Iran should govern the award and the seat of arbitration should be in
Tehran in case of disputes. The District Court as well as the Third
Circuit dismissed the case because the petition was time-barred by the
Delaware statute of limitation. Iran brought the claim six years after
the respondent’s refusal to arbitrate, which exceeded the Delaware
state of limitation of three years.
Iran has filed other cases to compel arbitration in disputes in
the US and elsewhere. As the Ashland and Mapco cases show, Iran
did not follow a very thoughtful strategy for its investment disputes.
For instance, Iran could have proceeded with arbitration in Tehran
and later tried to enforce the award in US courts. In investment
arbitration with Israel, Iran resorted to French Courts, which follow a
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE & INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra
note 28, at 221.
37. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987).
38. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, 983 F. 2d 485 (3d Cir. 1992).
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broader denial of access to justice doctrine. Iran entered into an
agreement concerning construction and maintenance of an oil pipeline
with Israel in 1968. The agreement contained an arbitration clause.
Upon the refusal of Israel to appoint an arbitrator, Iran brought its
case to French Courts on the ground of denial of access to justice
pursuant to Article 1493 French new civil procedure code.39 In
National Iranian Oil Co. v. Israel the Court of Appeals of Paris
agreed with the Iran National Oil Company that the claim was
admissible in French Courts due to the denial of justice even when
there was no reference to French law in the contract. It also declared
that if either party failed to appoint an arbitrator by a certain date it
would select one on behalf of the defaulting party.40
Iran is currently engaged in a controversial dispute over a gas
contract it concluded with United Arab Emirates (the “UAE”)
involving allegations of bribery and corruption. Due to the investment
of Iranian nationals in the UAE, Iran and the UAE have not
concluded a bilateral investment treaty. The famous 25-year Crescent
contract has been concluded with the UAE for the exportation of gas
after five years of negotiation finishing in 2001. According to the
contract, Iran is obligated to export 500 million cubic meters of gas to
the UAE. The low contract price along with its long-term
commitment persuaded the Iranian parliament to enter the scene and
call the contract against Iran’s national interest. Further investigation
of Iran’s parliament showed signs of bribery and corruption. In the
meantime, Crescent petitioned the International Court of Arbitration
claiming breach of contract by Iran.41 This case is one of the highly
politicized investment disputes involving Iran in recent years and as a
result, public information is sparse. Based on the available
information, if the deal was reached through fraud and bribery, Iran
39. Lindsay L. Chichester, National Iranian Oil Co. v. Israel: France Reinterprets Its
Code to Prevent “Denial of Justice,” Leaving Israel Between Iran and a Hard Place, 11 TUL.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 383, 384-85 (2003). Article 1493 of France’s nouveau code de procedure
provides: “The arbitration agreement may, directly or by reference to arbitration rules, appoint
the arbitrator or arbitrators or provide a mechanism for their appointment. If a difficulty arises
in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal in an arbitration which takes place in France or which
the parties have agreed shall be governed by French Procedural law, the most diligent party
may, in the absence of a clause to the contrary, apply to the president of the Tribunal de
Grande Instance of Paris in accordance with procedures of Article 1457.” Id.
40. Id. at 384-85.
41. Tamsin Carlisle, Iran Cancels Gas Deals with Crescent Petroleum, THE NATIONAL
(Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/iran-cancels-gas-deal-with-crescent
-petroleum (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
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might be able to cancel the contract. In all other cases, Iran cannot
invoke its internal law prohibition on the public sector arbitration
clause to justify its breach.42
Recently and after a long legal battle, Iran successfully
challenged some of the US Courts decisions rendered against Iran, as
violation of the Algiers Accords in Iran-US Claims Tribunal.43 The
Tribunal awarded Iran for expenses it reasonably incurred in the
litigations in the United States.
D. Investment Laws
1. Background
After the revolution occurred in 1979, the Islamic Republic of
Iran succeeded Pahlavi’s kingdom as the government of Iran. Soon
thereafter, Iran was engaged in the longest war of the 20th century
with Iraq. This brought about a lot of devastation and claimed
numerous lives in both Iran and Iraq. After the war, Iran was in urgent
need of investment to rebuild, recover and construct new facilities and
expand its infrastructure. The first comprehensive Iranian law
pertaining to foreign investment dates back to 1955 before the
Revolution. In the Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign
Investment, foreign individuals had to obtain Iranian Government
approval in order to benefit from its privileges. In this 7-article
legislation, there is no reference to any alternative dispute resolution
including arbitration.44
In 2002, Iran passed its second foreign direct investmentrelated law after almost 50 years. The Foreign Investment Promotion
and Protection Act (FIPPA)45 was a more comprehensive act
42. In a long battle with a Turkish cellular company, Turkcell, Iran won its first investorstate arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty. Iran Wins Landmark Investor-State Case,
GAR, available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33081/iran-wins-landmarkinvestor-state-case/ (last visted Mar. 3, 2014).
43. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Award No. 602-A15(IV)/A24-FT, Iran –
US Claims Tribunal, paras. 1-4, available at http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/
AWARD/1-A-AWARD%20NO.%20602-A15%20(IV)A24-FT-EN.pdf.
44. See The Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment, PARIS
TIMES, http://www.parstimes.com/law/foreign_investment55.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
45. See Ardeshir Atashi, Comparative Analysis of the Iranian Foreign Investment Law
and the World Bank Guidelines on Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 12 Y.B. ISLAMIC
& MIDDLE E. L. 111, 115-16 (2005-2006); see also The Foreign Investment Promotion and
Protection Act of 2005 (Iran), available at http://gsi.ir/General/Lang_en/Page_26/
Start_0/TypeId_All/LawsId_24/Action_MoreInfo/Foreign.Investment.Promotion.and.Protectio
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compared to the earlier one. Upon admission of the investment, the
investor enjoys some privileges and rights based on this Act. Iranians
who invest “capital with foreign origin” are also deemed to be
“foreign investor[s]” under Article 1.46 Investment includes, inter
alia, cash funds, machinery and equipment, tools and spares, patent
rights, technical know-how, trademarks, transferable dividends of
foreign investors and other permissible items approved by the Council
of Ministers under Article 1.47 Article 2, however, limits the scope of
investment. It should “bring about economic growth, upgrade
technology, enhance the quality of products, and increase
employment opportunities and exports” (Article 2).48 It also should
not pose any threat to the national security and public interests. These
qualifications, which remind us of the Salini Doctrine on
Investment,49 discourage investors who do not necessarily hold the
intention of promoting economic growth in Iran.
FIPPA stipulates several benefits and privileges for foreign
investors. For instance, Article 8 sets the principle of national and
non-discrimination treatment towards foreign investors.50 In the case
of expropriation, pursuant to Article 9 the Iranian Government
commits itself to providing compensation. Compensation is “on the
basis of the real value of the investment immediately before
expropriation.” Furthermore, the Act provides some privileges
regarding foreign currency exchange for foreign investors. For
instance, foreign investors can collect their investment and interest in
foreign currency.51 Regarding arbitration, FIPPA is not very
progressive. Although it recognizes the referral to arbitration by

n.Act.(.Fippa).html. This act was considered to be inconsistent with Islamic law by Guardian
Council. Eventually, it was ratified by Expediency Council, which has the authority to confirm
legislations that have been passed by the parliament but were rejected by Guardian Council. Id.
46. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2005, art. 1 (Iran).
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 2(b).
49. Salini Costruttori S.P.A and Italstrade v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (Jul. 31, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004) ("one may
add the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the investment as an
additional condition”). In the Salini ICSID case, the Tribunal declared that investment should
contribute to the economy of the host state, otherwise it cannot be considered an investment.
See id.
50. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2005, art. 8 (Iran).
51. Id. arts. 13, 14, 17(a). However, we should note that this privilege is subject to the
approval of the investment board and confirmation of the minister of economic affairs and
finance. Id.
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bilateral investment treaties, there is no explicit consent to any
specific arbitration body. Article 19 mentions:
“Disputes arising between the Government and the Foreign
Investors with regard to their respective mutual obligations
within the context of investments under FIPPA, if not settled
through negotiations, shall be referred to domestic courts, unless
the Law ratifying the Bilateral Investment Agreement with the
respective government of the Foreign Investor provides for
another method for settlement of disputes.”52

This might be considered an achievement since it allows the
referral to arbitration in the case of dispute between foreign investors
and the Iranian Government. As we will see in the next section, one
of the main obstacles of foreign investment is the Article on
arbitration in the Constitution.
E. Unfavorable National Laws to Foreign Investment
The Iranian legal system has serious shortcomings regarding
support of foreign direct investment. Some of them relate to the
Constitution and some others to statutes. Article 81 of the
Constitution, which concerns foreign business stipulates: “Granting of
concessions to foreigners for the incorporation of companies or
institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, service, or
mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden.”53
The broad language of the Article is quite discouraging for
foreign companies hoping to invest in Iran. Foreign companies have
to establish subsidiaries in Iran because they cannot be the majority
shareholders. The Council of Guardians, which is the interpretive
authority of the Iranian Constitution,54 specifies that in private sectors
foreign companies can own up to 49% of companies’ shares.
Furthermore, companies that are involved in commerce with the
Iranian Government can be incorporated in Iran for the purpose of
their legal and operational activities.55 It is also worth mentioning that
52. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act, BRITISH IRANIAN CHAMBER
COMMERCE, available at http://www.bicc.org.uk/downloads/fippa.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,
2014); Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2002 (Iran).
53. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 81.
54. Id. art. 98.
55. The interpretation of the Council of Guardians regarding Article 81 of the
Constitution can be found at their official website: http://www.shora-gc.ir/Portal/Home/
ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&ID=75c294c8-9fe5-4d8f-89a1-f77f7b1333c7&LayoutID=

OF
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Article 5 of Regulation on Investment in the Free Trade-Industrial
Zones states: “Foreign investors may invest in the economic activities
of the Zone up to any ratio (of the amount of investment).”56
Therefore, in certain parts of Iran considered to be “free zones,” some
restrictive regulations such as the aforementioned Article are not
enforced. Legally, however, this approach might not be very strong
since the Constitution rules over all parts of the country in a uniform
manner.
Another major obstacle in the Constitution concerning foreign
investment is Article 44. This article defines the scope of the state
sector, which should be publicly owned. In practice, the expansive
and wide scope of this Article places many important sectors of the
economy in the hands of the Government. Article 44 paragraph II
states:
“The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother
industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance,
power generation, dams, and large-scale irrigation networks,
radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services,
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be
publicly owned and administered by the State.”57

Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution poses yet another
critical challenge for the Iranian Government in the area of foreign
investment. The Government has desired to transfer its less lucrative
businesses to the private sector so that better management would
revive the businesses. For this reason, starting in 2005 under the
supervision of the Expediency Council, the Iranian Government
started to gradually transfer its businesses, including banking and
communications, to the private sector.58 The result was not as

41ac3004-064d-4591-9605-3bb75173947b&CategoryID=e2beada8-28bd-4ff4-a9f8-84d4ee0
a2973.
56. Regulations on Investment in the Free Trade-Industrial Zones (Iran), available at
http://www.iran-investment.org/irsubpage11.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
57. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 44.
58. The Supreme Leader of Iran announced a new interpretation of Article 44 of the
Constitution in order to initiate a strong momentum for privatization. EVALEILA PESARAN,
IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: REFORM AND COUNTER-REFORM IN THE
POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA 136 (2011).
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favorable as free trade advocates hoped, yet the movement has started
in that direction.59
Lastly, it is Article 139 of the Constitution which is related to
arbitration. Foreign investors, in general, are skeptical and reluctant to
refer their disputes to Iranian domestic courts and tend to prefer
arbitration. Article 139 of the Iranian Constitution, however, is a
major obstacle in this regard:
“The settlement of claims relating to public and state property or
the referral thereof to arbitration is in every case contingent on
the approval of the Board of Ministers, and the Parliament must
be informed of these matters. In cases where one party to the
dispute is a foreigner, as well as in important domestic cases, the
approval of the Parliament must also be obtained. Law will
specify the cases which are considered to be important.”60

Article 139 is drafted in a way that seems to favor the Iranian
side of the dispute. In other words, pursuant to an arbitration clause in
a bilateral investment treaty, the Iranian Government is subject to this
Article only if it decides to refer the matter to arbitration.61 On the
other hand, the foreign investors can refer the matter to arbitration and
the Iranian side can appear in front of the arbitration body and defend
its position. In this case, it seems there is no need for the approval of
the Council of Ministry or the Assembly. Furthermore, the Iranian
side cannot invoke the above-mentioned Constitutional requirement
to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.62

59. The reform did not result in the desired outcome due to several factors including lack
of robust private sector, government interference, lack of necessary capital, and the intrusion
of military sector. Id. at 161-89.
60. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 139
61. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Division on
Transnational Corporations and Investment, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. Division on Investment, Technology, and Enterprise Development,
Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of _______________., in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT INSTRUMENT: A COMPENDIUM VOLUME VI 479, 479-484 (2002) [hereinafter
IRANIAN MODEL BIT]. In some Iranian BITs, in the arbitration clause there is a phrase, which
might be inserted due to this Constitution obstacle. Paragraph 2 of Article 12 of Iranian Model
BIT declares: “either of them may refer the dispute to the competent courts of the host
Contracting Party or with due regard to their own laws and regulations to an arbitral tribunal of
three members referred to paragraph 5 below.” Id. (emphasis added).
62. Ardeshir Atai, Arbitration of Investment Disputes under Iranian Investment Treaties,
14 J. OF MONEY LAUNDERING C ONTROL 130, 130 (2011).
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There are other domestic provisions that are not friendly to
foreign investment. For instance, labor law in Iran, generally
speaking, makes it difficult for employers to lay-off employees.63
Furthermore, originally the tax imposed on corporations was 54%,
and it has been reduced to 25%.64 Still, this might be high taxation for
corporations, which can choose to operate in countries with much
lower income tax rates.
There are other obstacles in Iranian domestic law which make
foreign investment difficult. Ownership of real property for foreign
nationals requires a special process.65 First, the local Registry Office
should be adequately informed about the purchase. The transfer of
ownership is then subject to approval by the office of Ministry of
Foreign affairs on the condition of the principle of reciprocity.66
The fact that Iran is not part of major international institutions on
investment further complicates the foreign investment. Iran is not part
of ICISD, MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), or the
WTO (World Trade Organization). On the other hand, Iran has
recently been active in the realm of arbitration. Iran has adopted the
New York Convention67 and has passed legislation on arbitration
pursuant to UNCITRAL Rules.68 However, internationally, the US
and EU economic sanctions have made foreign direct investment
incredibly difficult in Iran.
F. The Effect of Iran’s Investment Laws on Arbitration
Considering the aforementioned constitutional restraints, the
enforcement of awards can be problematic. The Iranian domestic
legal system has recognized arbitral awards both in Civil Procedure

63. See, e.g., Art 21-33 of Iran Labor Law, available at http://www.princeton.edu/
irandataportal/laws/labor-law/laborcontracts/.
64. IRAN: COMPANY LAWS AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK, VOLUME 1: STRATEGIC
INFORMATION AND BASIC LAW 157-60 (2012).
65. Iran Export, Investment Climates: Status of Foreign Nationals, http://www.iranexport.ir/sections/investmentclimates/statusof.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
66. Id.
67. The Iranian Parliament ratified the New York Convention for Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in April 10, 2001. The Law of Accession of Islamic
Republic of Iran Government to the New York Convention for Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitration Award Drafted in 10 June, 1958, ISLAMIC PARLIAMENT RESEARCH CENTER,
http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90503 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
68. Hamid Gharavi, The 1997 Iranian International Commercial Arbitration Law: The
UNCITRAL Model Law à L'Iranienne, 15 ARB. INT’L 85, 85 (1999).
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and International Commercial Arbitration Law.69 In 2001, Iran also
became a member of the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.70 However, all of these
regulations include an exception concerning public policy or similar
concepts.71 In other words, the enforcement of arbitral awards is
conditioned to the situation where the awards are not contrary to the
public policy of the Government. In this situation, Article 139 of the
Iranian Constitution looms over all the arbitral awards. Many of the
arbitration awards that concern “settlement of claims relating to
public and state property” belong to the public sector (Article 44) and
require approval of the Assembly (Article 139).72 This provision of
the Constitution complicates the enforcement of arbitral awards.
On the other hand, once the Iranian Government signs a treaty or
contract comprising an arbitration clause, it seems implausible to
refuse its enforcement based on a public policy reservation related to
constitutional provisions. In other words, once the government agrees
to arbitration on certain issues, it clearly implies that referral to
arbitration in that case is not against its public policy. Evidently, if the
merits of the award violate “the most basic notions of morality and
justice,”73 Iranian courts can plausibly refuse to recognize and enforce
the award.74
69. Id. at 86-9; Aini Dadrasii Madani [Civil Procedure Code] Tehran 1379 [2000] arts.
454-501 (Iran); Qanuni Davari Tejari Beinolmelal [International Commercial Arbitration
Code] Tehran 1376 [1997] (Iran).
70. New York Convention Countries, N EW Y ORK A RBITRATION C ONVENTION ,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states (last visited
Mar. 3, 2014).
71. Art. V (2)(b) of the New York Convention declares: “[t]he recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. (hereinafter the New York Convention) Paragraph 2 of article 34
International Commercial Arbitration Code of Iran also enumerates public policy as a ground
for invalidation of arbitral awards: “if the content of the award is contrary to public policy or
public morality or the mandatory rules of this Act.” Qanuni Davari Tejari Beinolmelal, supra
note 64.
72. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran] 1358 [1980], arts. 44, 139.
73. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale (RAKTA), 508 F.2d
969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit declared that the public policy exception to
enforcement of the awards should be construed narrowly and only in cases related to the
state’s most basic notions of morality and justice. Id.
74. William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law:
Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 297 (2006-2007).
Constitutional requirement of due process, minimum contact, and forum non conveniens have
prompted tensions with enforcement of foreign awards in American Courts as well. This
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Although the bar for public policy reservation at the enforcement
stage is high, the constitutional restraints can be invoked at the
jurisdictional stage as well. The Iranian Government may invoke the
constitutional prohibition as an objection to the jurisdiction of the
arbitration tribunal in the case of investment disputes. In this regard,
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.75 This rule is without
prejudice to Article 46.” Article 46, on the other hand, declares that
states can argue that their consent was flawed in cases in which
“violation of internal law was manifest and concerned a rule of its
internal law of fundamental importance.”76 Hence, it seems
reasonable to argue that a constitutional prohibition amounts to a
‘manifest violation’ of internal law of fundamental importance. In our
context, therefore, the Iranian Government can refer to the
constitutional prohibition to prove its flawed consent to arbitration
unless the Assembly approves the arbitration. However, this
conclusion does not seem plausible both in international commercial
and investment arbitration.
In the context of international commercial arbitration, it has been
argued that it is the ‘international ordre public’ and ‘common law of
arbitration’ which mandate that states cannot invoke their internal law
to repudiate consent to arbitration. In the Bentler v. Belgium case, the
Tribunal did not accept the jurisdictional objection raised by Belgium
pursuant to Article 1672(2) of the Belgian Code judiciaire as to the
capacity of the officials to agree to arbitration. The Tribunal argued
that international public order rejected the jurisdictional objection
whenever a State with knowledge and intent, consents to arbitration
and later tries to nullify it with invocation of its internal law.77
Therefore, even if internal law is essential for national public order,
tension has been not been fully settled by precedents, which “all seem less than optimum in
their articulation of guiding principles.” Id.
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
76. Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 46 (“1. A State may not invoke the fact that
its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal
law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation
was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 2. A
violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the
matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.”).
77. Jan Paulsson, May a State Invoke its Internal Law to Repudiate Consent to
International Commercial Arbitration?, 2 ARB. INT’L 90, 90 (1986).
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the international public order dictates that states abide by their
concluded arbitration clauses. Some scholars posit that this argument
complements the modern rule of sovereignty immunity.78 Agreement
to arbitration is an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity and if a
State can invoke its internal law to repudiate arbitration, it defeats the
purpose of the waiver.79
Another argument might be that, at least, in cases where the
internal law of one party governs all aspects of the contract,
constitutional prohibition should prevent the arbitration from
proceeding. A similar issue came up in a case involving Iran. In
Cementation International Ltd v. Republique Islamique d’Iran,80 Iran
raised an objection pursuant to its constitutional prohibition. Based on
a contract between the Iran Ministry of Health and a British
Company, all related disputes should be resolved through conciliation
or arbitration. The contract also provided that Iranian law is governed
by the disputes and the arbitral tribunal should sit in Geneva. After
Iran defaulted on appointing an arbitrator, the Court of Arbitration of
ICC assigned an arbitrator for the defaulting party. The Tribunal
proceeded notwithstanding Iran’s objection on the ground that, inter
alia, the tribunal had not been constituted lawfully pursuant to the
contract and that the arbitration was against Iran’s constitution. Iran
challenged the award and sought its nullification in front of Swiss
courts. Both the lower and court of appeals concluded that parties
agreed to ICC award.81 The Swiss courts ruled that parties could not
invoke their constitutional provision in order to set aside the
arbitration clause.82 Although it is not obvious why the court (and the
tribunal) applied ICC rules, the argument concerning constitutional
provision is powerful. Once a state, short of cases of corruption and
fraud, acquiesced to refer a matter to arbitration, it implicitly waives
its right to invoke all internal conflicting provisions.
78. See, e.g., id. at 98.
79. Id.
80. See W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6063 (1986). The Court followed the Tribunal decision in the ICC Case no. 3526 (1982) and
declared that “to admit the principle of the approval of recourse to arbitration by the
government or legislature of a country that is party to the arbitration agreement is to allow that
party to unilaterally avoid the obligations that it freely undertook.” FOUCHARD GAILLARD
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 324 n. 367 (Emmanuel Gaillard
& John Savage eds., 1999).
81. STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FURTHER SELECTED
WRITINGS 231-32 (2011).
82. Id.
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In the context of international investment law, the same
conclusion can be reached. Since the governing legal body of
investment arbitration is international law, treaties have priority over
domestic law and “a State would be in violation of international law if
it gave effect to the conflicting rule of domestic law.”83 The
conflicting rule of domestic law, however, might, arguably, affect the
consent of the state. In Brandes v. Venezuela, the Venezuelan
Government challenged its (unilateral) consent to arbitration based on
its Constitution and the several decisions of the Venezuelan Supreme
Tribunal of Justice.84 The ICSID tribunal concluded that the consent
of Venezuela cannot be inferred from the Constitution and further the
decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice are not binding on the
ICSID Tribunal.85
The issue of unequivocal consent should not, however, be
conflated with the issue of conflicting domestic laws. Consent, as the
ICISD tribunal emphasized in the case of Plama v. Bulgaria “should
be clear and unambiguous.”86 On the other hand, when a state clearly
expressed its consent to arbitration, it cannot later invoke its
conflicting internal law, including its constitution, to refuse to accept
the arbitration jurisdiction. In Iran’s case, it also seems that the
constitutional prohibition is not of fundamental importance especially
when the executive branch consents to arbitration. Lastly, it is
important to note that, in cases of fraud and corruption, private parties
cannot take advantage of contracts when the state officials are clearly
acting beyond their authority.87
II. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
A. Legal Effects of BITs
Bilateral Investment Treaties are gaining increasing
importance in international law. BITs are, as some scholars believe,
83. Paulsson, supra note 77, at 99 n. 1.
84. Brandes Inv. Partners LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/3, Award, ¶ 48 (Aug. 2, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/BrandesAward.PDF.
85. Id. at ¶ 96-98.
86. “It is a well-established principle, both in domestic and international law, that such
an agreement [of the parties to submit a matter to arbitration] should be clear and
unambiguous.” Plama Consortium Ltd. v. the Republic of Bulg., ICISD Case No. ARB/03/24,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 198 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID
/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC521_En&caseId=C24.
87. Paulsson, supra note 77, at 98.
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the product of fear of developed countries of nationalization and
expropriation.88 Iran performed one of the earliest and significant
nationalization processes in 1951.89 The UN General Assembly also
recognized this nationalization of rights of developing states.90 This
further complicated the scene for developed countries. This caused
developed countries to search for and find alternative ways to protect
their investment and obtain proper compensation such as in cases of
expropriation. The first BIT dates back to 1959 between West
Germany and Pakistan and since then approximately 2600 BITs have
been concluded between different countries.91
As we saw, Iran has been the subject of foreign investment for
almost hundred years. The past investment agreements have created
cynicism towards foreign investment among Iranians. The
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly shows the overall
skepticism regarding foreign investment. One of the main concerns
dealt with providing concession to foreign companies for an extended
period of time as happened in the case of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company.
Surprisingly, however, Iran is a party to more than fifty BITs.92
The United States, by way of comparison, has concluded around forty
88. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreement, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 167-169 (2005-2006).
89. In a battle with Anglo-Iran Oil Company (AIOC), Mossadegh, Iran’s prime minister,
announced that Iran would sell oil directly to customers. See MOSTAFA ELM, OIL, POWER,
AND PRINCIPLE: IRAN’S OIL NATIONALIZATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 144 (1991). It was
followed by the passage of Iran’s nationalization act in Parliament and the evacuation of Brits
and employees of AIOC from oil-rich area of Abadan, Iran. See id. at 156-60.
90. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201 (S-VI), ¶ 4(e), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974) (“Full permanent sovereignty
of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these
resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation
with means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of
ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of
the State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to
prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right.”).
91. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, B ILATERAL I NVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (2010).
92. Bilateral Investment Treaties, ORGANIZATION FOR INVESTMENT ECONOMIC AND
TECHNICAL A SSISTANCE OF I RAN, http://www.oietai.ir/en/investmenguide/treaties (last
visited Mar. 3, 2014). According to the website of Organization for Investment Economic and
Technical Assistance of Iran affiliated with Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance the list
of the countries Iran has BITs with is as follows: Armenia (1995), Belarus (1995), Tajikistan
(195) Georgia (1995), Pakistan (1995), Kazakhstan (1996), Turkmenistan (1996), Yemen
(1996), Ukraine (1996), Kyrgyzstan (1996), Bosnia & Herzegovina (1996), Azerbaijan (1996),
Turkey (1996), South Africa (1997), Lebanon (1997), Syria (1998), Switzerland (1998),
Poland (1998), Poland (1998), South Korea (1998), Bulgaria (1998), Italy (1999), Zimbabwe
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BITs.93 This shows, despite cynicism towards foreign investment,
sanctions and domestic problems, Iran has been quite active in the
area of BITs. These BITs are with both developed and developing
countries. They were signed primarily between 1995 and 2007,
almost 5 years after the end of the Iran-Iraq war and extend until the
aftermath of new sanctions.
However the question is what is the legal status of the
investment treaties under Iranian Law? Do they bind the Iranian
government? According to Article 77 of Iran’s Constitution
“International treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be
approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.”94 The broad
language of this article includes almost every important international
legal activity of the Iranian Government. If the Assembly passes a
specific treaty, then pursuant to Civil Code Article 9: “Treaty
stipulations which have been, in accordance with the Constitutional
Law, concluded between the Iranian Government and other
government, shall have the force of law.”95 Therefore, for BITs, it
seems that the approval of the Assembly is required. After the
ratification of the Assembly (Parliament), they are treated as
municipal laws of Iran. According to the official website, almost all
the 58 BITs have been ratified by the Iranian Parliament and roughly
50 of BITs are in force as of today.96
However, when it comes to arbitration and its jurisdiction,
national municipal law is of secondary importance. In other words,
when there is an explicit consent to arbitration, the resort to local
authorities and municipal laws might not be accepted. For instance,
two cases were brought to ICSID for the interpretation of a national
law in Venezuela. Article 22 of the Law on the Promotion and
(1998), Qatar (1998), Sudan (1998), Croatia (2000), Uzbekistan (2000), Macedonia (2000),
China (2000), Srilanka (2000), Morocco (2001), Austria (2001), Tunisia (2001), Bangladesh
(2001), Oman (2001), Romania (2002), Hellenic Republic (2002), Malaysia (2002), Germany
(2002), North Korea (2002), Bahrain (2002), Spain (2002), Finland (2002), France (2003),
Algeria (2003), Ethiopia (2003), Serbia & Montenegro (2003), Venezuela (2005), Indonesia
(2005), Sweden (2005), Afghanistan (2006), Libya (2006), Kuwait (2007), Kuwait (2007),
Union of the Comoros (2008), Eritrea (2008), Cyprus (2009). Vietnam (2009), Kenya (2009).
Gambia (2007). Id.
93. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS
AND COMMENTARY 10 (2005).
94. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 77.
95. Qanuni Madani [Civil Code] Tehran 1314 [1935], art. 9.
96. See Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 92.
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Protection of Investment of Venezuela refers to the consent to ICSID.
The Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, however, reads the
provision differently. In Cemex v. Venezuela and Brandeis v.
Venezuela, the Tribunal believed that “a sovereign state’s
interpretation of its own unilateral consent to the jurisdiction of an
international tribunal is not binding on the tribunal or determinative of
jurisdictional issues.” 97
The above-mentioned cases are concerning interpretation of
consent. In Iran’s BITs, there is explicit consent to arbitration. But, in
case of arbitration, the Iranian Government might challenge the
jurisdiction of the arbitration based on the fact that the Assembly
never ratified the BIT. In CSOB v. Slovakia, the BIT between the
countries never came into force.98 In this case, because there was a
reference to arbitration in the investment agreement, the tribunal
found sufficient ground for jurisdiction.99 Some authors believe that
the BITs consent clause is only “an offer to investors that need to be
accepted.”100 Therefore, without an investment agreement referring to
arbitration, the consent is not perfected. However, this approach does
not seem be correct. As long as there is an unambiguous consent to
arbitration, contrary domestic legal rules cannot constrain it. The
approach is concordant with the Pacta Sunt Servanda principle.101
Additionally, arbitration bodies tend to prioritize international law
over national law. The reason is obvious. Investors rely on BITs and
investment laws and are not necessarily aware of the intricacies of all
domestic laws. With the act of investment, they already perfected the
consent for referral of the disputes to arbitration. Therefore, it does
97. Cemex Caracas Inve B.v. & Cemex Caracas II Inv. B.V v. Bolivarian Republic
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Dec. 30, 2010),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0142.pdf; see also Brandes
Investment Partners, LP v. Venez, supra note 84, ¶ 105.
98. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. the Slov., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4
(1999). Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 27 (May 24, 1999).
99. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. the Slov., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4
(1999). Decision of the Tribunal on Respondent’s Further and Partial Objection to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 27 (Dec. 1, 2000), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC558_En&caseId=C160.
100. Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 830, 864-66 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
101. Pacta sunt servanda, or the principle of sanctity of contracts is best reflected in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna Convention, supra
note 75; see also, MARK EUGEN VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 363-68 (2009).
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not seem that the barrier of Iran’s Constitution can hinder the
jurisdiction of the arbitration body.
1. Content Analysis
Precursors to BITs were the Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation treaties (FCN).102 The principal objective of FCNs was to
facilitate trade and navigation. They were not specifically designed
for investment. However, they contained three main components of
modern BITs, namely treatment provisions, expropriation, and
exchange control.103 FCN, however, contained a broad range of issues
including right of entry, access to local courts, tax issues, treatment of
products, custom treatment, technical experts, and many more.104
Gradually, these diverse issues became subject to different treaties
and resolutions, and investment became the subject of BITs.
Additionally, on August 15, 1955 the United States in signed a FCN
treaty with Iran.105
According to some scholars, there are four possible ways that
BITs relate to investment.106 They protect, liberalize, promote, or
regulate them. The majority of BITs, however, focus on protection of
investment because it implicitly promotes investment as well. BITs
rarely tend to regulate investment since it might defeat their purpose
to encourage investment. Regulations of specific investments occur in
the contract between the investor and the host state. BITs typically
incorporate four major components:107 1) general treatment of
investment and investors: in this part of the BITs, government
commits themselves to national treatment, the most favorite nation,
fair and equitable treatment and also the umbrella clause. 2)
Standards related to expropriation: In these clauses, government
usually commits themselves to compensate the investor in the case of
102. MUTHUCUMARASWAM SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 180-82 (2010).
103. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United
States, 21 CORNELL INT ’L L.J. 201, 207 (1988).
104. Rudolf Dolzer & Margaret Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, in FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 47, 47 (Bishop et al. eds., 2005); REISMAN ET AL., supra note 93.
105. This FCN has been invoked in many occasions since the aftermath of Revolution in
Iran. One of these occasions was in the case before International Court of Justice on US Navy
attacks on some Iranian oil platforms. Both sides invoked this treaty to support their conduct.
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I. C. J. 161, ¶¶ 31-34 (Nov. 6, 2003).
106. VANDEVELDE, supra note 91, at 5.
107. REISMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 10-11; Vandevelde, supra note 103, at 202.

1758 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1731
nationalization and expropriation. The compensation typically is
calculated based on the fair market value of the investment. 3)
Provisions related to the free transfer of currency, investment and its
interests both in and outside the country: Countries impose different
currency policies and limitations on the amount exported on foreign
currencies. The BITs guarantee free transfer of foreign currency for
investors. 4) Arbitration Clauses: an important part of almost all BITs,
which is pivotal to the attraction of foreign investment, is the dispute
settlement mechanism. Foreign investors tend to be skeptical about
national courts deciding cases related to its government measures.108
They prefer arbitration bodies to mainly adjudicate based on
international laws and standards.
Iran’s model BIT contains 15 articles and a preamble.109 Article
1 concerns the definition of investment.110 Investment includes: ‘a)
movable and immovable property b) shares or any kind of
participation in companies c) money and/or receivables d) industrial
and intellectual property such as patent, utility models, designs or
models, trade marks and names, know-how and goodwill e) rights to
search for, extract or exploit natural resources’. There are three ways
investment can be enumerated in investment laws: asset-based model
(which lists the assets subject to protection), transaction-based model
(which lists the transactions investor make), and enterprise-based
model (which lists business organizations investor can form).111 The
model Iranian BIT, according to the definition of investment, follows
an‘asset-based’ approach. Article 1 also defines investors, which
includes natural as well as legal persons.
Article 2 promotes investment.112 As long as the investment is
within Iran’s law and regulations, the investment is subject to
protection. Article 3 mentions admission of investment, meaning each
contracting party shall provide necessary permits to investors.113
Article 4 deals with protection of investment.114 Paragraph One of
Article 4 declares: “Investment . . . shall receive the host Contracting
108. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Three Laws of International Investment: National,
Contractual, and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital, 151-52 (2013).
109. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 479-84.
110. Id. at 479.
111. Engela C. Schlemmer, Investment, Investor, Nationality, and Shareholders, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 100, at 52.
112. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 480.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 480-81.

2014]

COMBATTING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1759

Party’s full legal protection and fair treatment not less favorable than
that accorded to investors of any third state who are in a comparable
situation.”115
This provision sets two important treatment components of
BITs: fair and equitable treatment and the most favorite nation (MFN)
clause. In Paragraph Two, however, the special privileges conferred
for free trade, custom union, and common market to other states are
excluded from the MFN clause. Article 5 extends the MFN clause to
the provisions of other agreements as well.116 In other words,
investors can “cherry pick” different favorable provisions from
different agreements each contracting party concluded with other
investors.117 Article 6 is about expropriation:
“1. Investment of natural and legal persons of either Contracting
Party shall not be nationalized, confiscated, expropriated or
subjected to similar measures by the other Contracting Party
except such measures are taken for public purposes, in
accordance with due process of law, in a non-discrimination
manner, and effective and appropriate compensation is
envisaged. The amount of compensation shall be paid without
delay.”118

Hence, expropriation is allowed if it is for public purposes.
This is in line with recent BITs of the United States.119 The term
‘public purpose’ is rather vague in this context. But, Iranian BITs,
similar to new generations of BITs, emphasize two aspects of due
process and compensation without delay in the case of expropriation.
The BIT model of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not explicitly
refer to indirect expropriation. Indirect expropriation might occur in
cases such as levying burdensome taxation. Some BITs, such as ones
115. Id. at 480.
116. Id. at 481.
117. A few Iranian BITs have more detailed provisions on MFN and national treatment.
For instance Iran-Germany BIT Article 3(b) mentions: “The following shall, in particular, be
deemed "treatment less favorable" within the meaning of Paragraph 1 of this Article: unequal
treatment in the case of restrictions on the purchase of raw or auxiliary materials, of energy or
fuel or of means of production or operation of any kind, unequal treatment in the case of
impeding the marketing of products inside or outside the country, as well as any other
measures having similar effects.”
118. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 481.
119. Vandevelde, supra note 103, at 231-32. Regarding compensation for expropriation
it talks about US approach, which is derived from in Secretary of State Cordell Hull approach:
“The BIT… incorporates the traditional United States view of international law, requiring
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriated property.” Id.
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with Switzerland, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the language of the BITs
are more explicit regarding indirect expropriation: “Neither of the
Contracting Parties shall take, either directly and indirectly, measures
of expropriation or nationalization against investments . . . .”120
Article 7 deals with national treatment in losses caused by war,
armed conflict, revolution, and similar state of emergency.121 The
third main components in BITs are referred to in Article 8, which is
about repatriation and transfer.122 Each contracting state should permit
transfers related to investment in returns, proceeds from the sale,
royalties, and loan installment among others. Article 9 sets the
framework for cases of subrogation.123 Article 10 talks about
observance of commitment and Article 11 deals with the scope of the
agreement.124 The fourth component of BITs, which is dispute
settlement, is discussed in Articles 12 and 13.125
2. Arbitration Clauses
Iranian BITs, similar to other leading countries BITs, stipulate
two occasions for arbitration.126 One is when the contracting parties
disagree on the interpretation or application of the BIT. In this case,
model BITs suggest that each contracting party appoint an arbitrator
120. Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic of Iran on
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Mar. 8, 1998, UNCTAD.ORG,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_iran.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,
2014); see Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the
Government of the Republic of Belarus and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
July 14, 1995, UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/iran_belarus.pdf
(last visited, Mar 3, 2014); see Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 1996, UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iia/docs/bits/kazakhstan_iran.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
121. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 481.
122. Id. at 481-90.
123. Id. at 482.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 482-84.
126. For instance Article 12 of the Iranian Model BIT deals with the arbitration for
settlement of disputes between the host government and investor(s) while Article 13 stipulates
arbitration for settlement of disputes between contracting parties as to interpretation and
application of the treaty. Id.; see also Roberto Echandi, Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Investment Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Recent Developments in Investment
Rulemaking, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 3, 24
(2010) (“These IIAs [i.e., international investment agreements] contain provisions that grant
specialized competent authorities of the Contracting Parties the right to make interpretations of
certain matters or provisions of the agreement, which will be binding for the arbitral tribunal.”)
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within sixty days. The parties’ arbitrators appoint the umpire. In the
case of the refusal of one party, upon request, the President of the
International Court of Justice appoints the arbitrator for the failing
party.127 The cost of the arbitration will be split equally between the
parties and the decision of the arbitration is binding.
Article 12 deals with cases of dispute between a contracting
party and investor of the other contracting party.128 In this case, each
party has to wait six months “from the date of notification of the
claim by one party to the other.” This intervening period allows
parties to think twice about their legal claims and possibly reach an
amicable settlement. If a dispute refers to the tribunal prior to the six
months, then the dispute is rejected based on an admissibility ground
and not jurisdiction. The mechanism of appointing the arbitration
tribunal resembles that of the Article 13. The only difference is that it
is the Secretary of General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that
appoints the arbitrator for the failing party.129 The arbitration clause of
Iranian BITs also contains the fork in the road clause.130 This clause
basically requires the investor to choose between the domestic and
arbitration tribunal. Investors cannot pursue their claims in both
national and international tribunals. Paragraph 3 and 4 of Article 12
declare:
“A dispute primarily referred to the competent courts of the host
Contracting Party, as long as it is pending, cannot be referred to
arbitration save with the parties agreement; and in the event that
a final judgment is rendered, it cannot be referred to arbitration.
National courts shall not have jurisdiction over any dispute
referred to arbitration. However, the provisions of this paragraph

127. IRANIAN M ODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 483-84. “In case the umpire is to be
appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice, if the President of the
International Court of Justice is prevented from carrying out the said function or if he is a
national of either Contracting Party, the appointment shall be made by the vice-president of the
International Court of Justice, and if the vice-president is also prevented from carrying out the
said function or he is a national of either Contracting Party, the appointment shall be made by
the senior member of the said court who is not a national of either Contracting Party.” Id.
128. Id. at 482-83.
129. Id. at 483 (“In the event that each party fails to appoint its arbitrator within the
mentioned period and/or the appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the umpire, each of the
parties may request the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to appoint the
failing party’s arbitrator or the umpire, as the case maybe.”).
130. Id. at 482-83.

1762 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1731
do not bar the winning party to seek for the enforcement of the
arbitral award before national courts.”131

The BITs Iran has concluded with countries is sometimes
slightly different from the Model BIT. Starting from the waiting
period, it ranges from three to six months.132 Some Iranian BITs
require a detailed notification of the claim from the investor to the
contracting party.133 Interestingly enough, for a few Iranian BITs,
there is no fork in the road clause. For example, in Iran-Greece and
Iran-Switzerland there is no specific provision in cases where disputes
are pursued in national courts.134 A few others, however, explicitly
forbid national courts from investigating disputes between investors
and other governments.135 Iran has concluded a few BITs that
stipulate a waiver of local proceedings clause.136 This is similar to the
NAFTA article 1121(1)(b), which requires written waiver of the right
of investors to seek local remedies in case they pick NAFTA
arbitration.137 For instance, in the Iran-Germany BIT there is a waiver
clause with similar requirement.138
131. Id. at 483.
132. Atai, supra note 62, at 135. In the Iran-Croatia BIT, the waiting period is twelve
months.
133. Id. at 136. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain_
Iran-Spain, 2002, UNCTAD.ORG,
iran.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (declaring “Disputes that may arise . . . shall be notified in
writing including a detailed information, by the investor to the former Contracting Party.”).
134. See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments GreeceIran, March 13, 2001, UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/greece_iran.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
135. Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austria-Iran,
Feb. 15, 2001, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/193
[hereinafter A USTRIA-IRAN B IT ]. Paragraph Seven of Article 11 of Iran-Austria BIT, for
instance, declares: “National courts shall not have jurisdiction over any dispute referred to
arbitration. However, the provisions of this paragraph do not bar the winning party to seek for
the enforcement of the arbitral award before national courts.” Id. at 10.
136. Atai, supra note 62, at 137.
137. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1121(b), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1983), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-112.asp
(emphasis added) (“(b) The investor and, where the claim is for loss or damage to an interest in
an enterprise of another Party that is a juridical person that the investor owns or controls
directly or indirectly, the enterprise, waive their right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement
procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged
to be a breach referred to in Article 1116, except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or
other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages, before an administrative
tribunal or court under the law of the disputing Party”).
138. Bilateral Investment Treaty, Iran-Ger. art. 11(3) (2005) (“In the event an investor of
a contracting party has submitted a dispute to the local competent court the dispute may be
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Arbitration clauses in BITs can take different forms depending
on the forum parties choose for arbitration.139 In general, there are two
main types of arbitration tribunals: permanent and ad hoc.140 ICSID,
Permanent Court of Arbitration, and even Iran-US Claims Tribunal
are examples of permanent arbitration bodies.141 There is an
increasing tendency to refer the disputes to ICSID in investment
disputes.142 Since Iran is not yet a member to ICSID, the arbitration
clause primarily refers to ad hoc arbitration. However, there are a few
BITs that refer to ICSID jurisdiction.143 In Iran-Korea, Iran-France,
Iran-Greece, Iran-Austria, and Iran-Italy BITs, investors have multiple
options, including ICSID.144 Article 11 of Iran-Austria BIT stipulates
that:
“2. In the event that such a dispute cannot be settled as provided
in paragraph 1 of this Article the investor in question may, at his
choice, submit the dispute for settlement to:
(a) The competent court of the Contracting Party, which is a
party to the dispute;
(b) An ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal, in compliance with the
arbitration rules of the UN Commission on the International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL);
(c) The International Chamber of Commerce under its rules of
arbitration;
(d) The International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, for the implementation of the arbitration procedure under
the Washington Convention of 18 March 1965, on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, if
or as soon as both Contracting Parties have acceded to it;

referred to international arbitration provided the party submitting the dispute to arbitration
bears the costs of the proceedings so far incurred and the court has not yet rendered a judgment
in substance, if so required.”).
139. See REISMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at Chapter 4.
140. Cesare P.R. Romano et al., Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues,
and Players, in the OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 3, 10 (2013).
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id. at 298.
143. Atai, supra note 62, at 142-43.
144. Agreement for the Promotion and the Protection of Investments, Iran-S. Kor., Oct.
31, 1998, UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/rep%20korea_
iran.PDF (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Decree
No. 2004-1279, Fr.-Iran, May 12, 2003, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/1232; see AUSTRIA -IRAN B IT, supra note 135.
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(e) Any other dispute settlement procedure agreed upon by the
parties to the dispute.
4. Each Contracting Party hereby consents to the submission of
investment disputes to the court and international Arbitrations
mentioned above.”145
Interestingly enough, the moment Iran decides to join ICSID, it
will already have concluded BITs with a few countries that include
ICSID arbitration. Also, it explicitly consents to ICSID jurisdiction.146
Ad hoc arbitration tribunal, furthermore, can have different
arbitral regimes. Some are following UNCITRAL arbitration rules
and some do not. In Iran, the majority of BITs cases do not refer to
UNCITRAL arbitration rules. In a few, such as Iran-Poland, IranBelarus, Iran-Lebanon, Iran-Austria and Iran-Italy there is a provision
on the governance of UNCITRAL.147 The ad hoc arbitration tribunal
should follow UNCITRAL arbitration rules in its procedure. In other
Iranian BITs, however, there is no provision regarding the governing
rules of the ad hoc arbitration tribunal. In this case, as Article 12
Paragraph Six of Iran-China BIT stipulates “the ad hoc tribunal shall
determine its own procedure and the place of arbitration.” 148 In other
words, in these ad hoc arbitration tribunals, the arbitrators design the
governing procedure rules.149

145. A USTRIA-IRAN B IT, supra note 135.
146. Atai, supra note 62, at 142-43.
147. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Iran-Leb.,
October 28, 1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1654; e.g.,
Paragraph B of Article 8 of Iran-Italy BIT (“b) an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal, in compliance with
the arbitration rules of the UN Commission on the International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); the
host Contracting Party undertakes hereby to accept the reference to said arbitration.”);
Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Belr.-Iran, July 14,
1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/302; see A USTRIA-IRAN
B IT, supra note 135.
148. Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, China-Iran,
June 22, 2000, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/744
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
149. RESIMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 435-43 (arguing Sapphire Int’l Petroleum v
National Iranian Oil Co. 35 I.L.R 136 (1936) is an example of this type of ad hoc arbitration
tribunal).
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III. COMBATTING SANCTIONS
A. The Nature of International Economic Sanctions
International sanctions are a reality in international affairs and
can be traced back to ancient Greece.150 Economic Sanctions aim to
discontinue the economic benefits, which a specific country is
receiving from its foreign trade. Economic sanctions serve as an
essential foreign policy tool to alter the behavior of a targeted state.
Imposition of international sanctions is the most important form of
countermeasures in international law for punishing a wrongdoing
state. Since the collapse of the bipolar system, the world has
witnessed a significant growth in economic sanctions, partially due to
the unprecedented inter-connectedness of today’s economy, which
has facilitated the imposition of economic sanctions.151
Yet, there is an inherent conflict in the theory of economic
sanctions. Scholars have attempted to justify it based on the theory of
‘outcasting’.152 International actors boycott a wrongdoing actor until it
decides to change its behavior. However, the theory of economic
outcasting remains at conflict with the mainstream perspectives on
international dynamics and relations. The theory behind economic
sanction is at odds from liberalism that endorses economic
engagement as a principal means for conflict resolution.153 Boycotting
a state would likely result in aggravation of conflict since a downturn
of economic factors weakens the middle class base required for
pressure on states. On the other hand, following realism, another
150. KERN ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LAW & POLICY 8 (2009) (“Athens,
imposed economic sanctions in 432 BC when Pericles issued the Megarian import embargo
against Greek city-states which has refused to join the Athenian-led Delian League during
Peloponnesian War.”).
151. P. EDWARD HALEY, STRATEGIES OF DOMINANCE: THE MISDIRECTION OF U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 5 (2006) (“American primacy gave the United States unprecedented freedom
of action and brought coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions into the paradigm with
much greater frequency . . . .”).
152. Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE L. J. 252, 302 (2011-2012). Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro
argue that international law is law because it enforces its obligations through outcasting: “very
little of international law meets the Modern State Conception of international law—very little
(if any) of it is enforced through brute physical force deployed by an institution enforcing its
own rules. But what is interesting is not so much what international law is not, but what it is.
And that is law that operates almost entirely through outcasting and external enforcement.” Id.
153. JOHN MACMILLIAN, ON LIBERAL PEACE: DEMOCRACY, WAR AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 114-24 (1998).
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major paradigm of international relations, economic sanctions would
not end in favorable results since sanctions eliminate cooperation by
isolating the wrongdoer. Recurrent and long-tem interactions between
states foster a rational-based cooperation even among hostile states,
according to realism.154 Following this logic, isolation of states
reduces interaction between states and dis-incentivizes the isolated
state to reciprocate. This eliminates the possibility of cooperation, a
matter, which is in conflict with the end goal of economic, sanctions:
to compel the targeted state to cooperate. Finally, from a
constructivism standpoint, isolation would result in deprivation from
international society norms. Constructivist paradigm emphasizes on
the non-physical and ideational aspects of international relations.155
Evidently isolation of a specific state prevents it from adopting or
adhering to any of the shared values of international community. In
short, it is not clear whether economic sanctions exert desired impact
on targeted states and fulfill its promises. As shown, theoretically,
economic outcasting suffers from internal incoherence.156
In the Iran case, the new deal has been cherished as a successful
case of economic sanctions that brought a “rogue state” to the serious
negotiation talks.157 It is hard to measure the effectiveness of
economic sanctions. Some studies find it to be an effective way of
changing the behavior of states, if properly implemented.158 Some do

154. ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 60-63 (1984). Axelrod
offers an elaborate explanation of how cooperation merge in an international setting in which
anarchy is the constitute logic. His question is under what conditions cooperation emerges in a
world with no central authority and rationalist state-actors. In his seminal work he uses the
prisoner dilemma game to show that long-term interaction would foster and stabilize
cooperation. He refers to the “live-and-let-live system” of World War I, to show that even in
times of war, long-term interaction would eventuate in some levels of cooperation. See id.
155. Constructivists endeavor to infuse the development of social sciences into the
traditional rigid literature of international relations, Vendulka Kubalkova et al., Constructing
Constructivism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CONSTRUCTED WORLD 3, 36-38 (1998).
156. See generally Farshad Ghodoosi, The Sanctions Theory: A Frail Paradigm for
International Law? (on file with the author).
157. Jim Sciutto, Senators Propose New Iran Sanctions Bill: White House Opposed,
CNN (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/19/politics/iran-sanctions-senate/. For
instance, Robert Mendez, a New Jersey Democrat Senator, declared “current sanctions brought
Iran to the negotiating table.” That was the reasoning behind his bi-partisan proposal to step up
the level of pressure on Iran through enacting further economic sanctions. See id.
158. See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED (2009).
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not.159 Iran’s case is no exception. It is very hard to gauge the
effectiveness of economic sanctions in Iran’s case.
Yet, recent rhetoric has centered on the fact that economic
sanctions have been working and that the change in Iran’s behavior
came as a result of crippling economic sanctions. However, before
one can conclude such a general statement, it is helpful to look at
following facts:
1. Sanctions showed their strongest teeth from 2010 onwards. A
web of economic sanctions imposed by the UN, the US and the EU
aimed to strangle the Iranian economy, provoked social unrests and
halted the Iranian Government’s enrichment activity.160 The Iranian
economy suffered tremendously as a result of sanctions. The Rial, the
Iranian currency, lost almost 200% of its value.161 The sale of oil also
dropped from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to 1 million barrels
per day in 2013.162 Yet, there is little evidence showing that the
Iranian government suffered as result of these sanctions.163 As a
Rentier State,164 those with special privileges continued to import and
159. See generally ERNEST H. PREEG, FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD WITH
SANCTIONS: UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST (1999).
160. Nader Habibi, The Iranian Economy in the Shadow of Sanctions, in IRAN AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: PETRO POPULISM, ISLAM AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 172, 172-74
(Parvin Alizadeh & Hassan Hakimian eds., 2014).
161. Steven Plaut, The Collapse of Iran’s Rial, GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Feb. 21, 2013,
5:00 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3597/iran-rial-collpase.
162. See Sanctions, IRAN MATTERS: BEST ANALYSIS AND FACTS ON THE IRANIAN
NUCLEAR CHALLENGE FROM HARVARD’S BELFER CENTER, available at http://
iranmatters.belfercenter.org/sanctions (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (providing a concise review
of the impact of economic sanctions on Iran’s economy).
163. See, e.g., Oren Dorell, Iran Nuclear Sanctions Hurt the Middle Class, not Guards,
USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-1117/iran-nuclear-sanctions-backfire/51275666/1; Beheshteh Farshneshani, In Iran, Sanctions
Hurt the Wrong People, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/roomfordebate/2013/11/19/sanctions-successes-and-failures/in-iran-sanctions-hurt-the-wrongpeople; Jamal Abdi & Trita Parsi, Opinion: Sanctions Against Iran Hurt the People, Not the
Regime, NEWSDAY (Aug. 5, 2012), http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/sanctions-againstiran-hurt-the-people-not-the-regime-opinion-1.3881126; Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi &
Muhammad Sahimi, The Sanctions Aren’t Working, FOREIGN POLICY (July 5, 2012), available
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/05/the_sanctions_aren_t_working.
164. “Rentier States are defined here as those countries that receive on a regular basis
substantial mounts [sic] of external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by
foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a
given country…a moment’s reflection will reveal that oil revenues received by the
governments of the oil exporting countries can also be external rents…the governments of the
oil exporting countries in the Middle East benefit from differential and monopolistic rents that
arise from higher productivity of the Middle Eastern oilfields and price fixing practices of the
oil companies.” Hossein Mahdavi, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in
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export from a black market, this time even without any strong
competitors from the Iranian domestic market.
2. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, there have been several
periods of social unrest,165 the last of which followed the June 2009
election.166 As far as analyses show, none of these social unrests had a
strong economic motive behind them: the Reformist Movement of
1997-2001 has political goals including promotion of democracy, rule
of law as well as establishing a robust civil society.167 During student
protests in 1999 the main request was political in nature too, i.e.
request for freedom.168 In 2009, the crowd gathered in the streets
because of their objection to the result of the election.169 However, no
major social unrests have been reported since the 2010
implementation of “crippling sanctions.”170
3. Economic sanctions also seem to be ineffective in halting
nuclear enrichment activity of the Iranian Government. With 190
centrifuges before the sanctions, Iran extended its program to 19000
centrifuges following the 2010 sanctions.171 It seems that the
sanctions came nowhere close to crippling the enrichment activity of
the Iranian government.

Rentier States: The Case of Iran, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE
EAST: FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY 428, 428-29 (M.A. Cook ed., 1970)
(footnote omitted).
165. See generally SIMIN FADAEE, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN IRAN: ENVIRONMENTALISM
AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2012).
166. See, e.g., Nazila Fathi & Michael Slackman, Iran Stepping Up Effort to Quell
Election Protest, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/25/world/middleeast/25iran.html?_r=0; Timeline: Iran’s Post Eleciton Protests, FIN.
TIMES (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/533d966e-755a-11dfa7e2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GN4X6ujT.
167. MAJID MOHAMMADI, JUDICIAL REFORM AND REORGANIZATION IN 20TH CENTURY
IRAN: STATE-BUILDING, MODERNIZATION AND ISLAMICIZATION 184 (2008).
168. Student Protests Shake Iran’s Government, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/11/world/student-protests-shake-iran-s-government.html.
169. Robert F. Worth & Nazila Fathi, Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes
Vote, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/
middleeast/14iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
170. Akbar Ganji, US Crippling Sanctions Against Iran: A New Wave of AntiAmericanism (Part I), HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
akbar-ganji/us-crippling-sanctions-ag_b_3860933.html.
171. See Iran’s Nuclear Timetable, IRAN WATCH: TRACKING IRAN’S UNCONVENTIONAL
WEAPON CAPABILITIES (Feb. 21, 2014), available at http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpublications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable (providing a quick overview of progress
of Iran’s nuclear program).
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4. Long before the recent stringent sanctions, Western countries
had a better deal with Iran in 2003: total suspension of enrichment
activity, not for 6 months but indefinitely (see Tehran Declaration).172
There was no discussion of the “right to enrichment” either. It was
simply a better deal from the Western countries perspective.173 After
almost 10 years, with crippling sanctions in place, Iran is not
suspending its entire enrichment,174 and also in one reading, its “right
to enrichment” is actually implicitly recognized.175 After all, the
comprehensive deal-to-come should “involve[] a mutually defined
(uranium) enrichment program.”176
This Section aimed to show that economic sanctions do not
enjoy having a well-founded theoretical base. In Iran’s case also there
are serious doubts as to whether economic sanctions resulted in the
desired outcome.
B. International Sanctions Imposed on Iran
In addition to some major legal shortcomings in the Iranian legal
system, the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, European
Union, and US Congress has complicated the investment in Iran even
further. The increasing sanctions on Iran have mainly been due to it
controversial nuclear program.177 These sanctions are so broad and
far-reaching that they might even cover minor transactions related to
personal property located in Iran.178 US sanctions on Iran apply to all
172. See Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers, INT’L
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (Oct. 21, 2003), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/
statement_iran21102003.shtml. In 2003, a nuclear agreement reached between Iran and three
European countries, i.e., England, France, and Germany. In a trip to Tehran they signed a deal
with Iran in which Iran pledged to suspend its nuclear enrichment, which it did. Id.
173. See Trita Parsi, No, Sanctions Didn’t Force Iran to Make a Deal, FOREIGN POLICY
(May 14, 2014), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/14/sanctions_
did_not_force_iran_to_make_a_deal_nuclear_enrichment.
174. See id.
175. Mark Fitzpatrick, Assessing the Iranian Nuclear Deal, THE INT’L INSTITUTE FOR
STRATEGIC STUD. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2014-0f13/
february-e91c/assessing-the-iranian-nuclear-deal-076e.
176. Preamble, Joint Plan of Action (Nov. 24, 2013), available at http://eeas.europa.eu/
statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf.
177. A brief history of Iran’s Sanctions can be found at the Iran Matters website from
Harvard’s Belfer Center. See Sanctions, IRAN MATTERS: BEST ANALYSIS AND FACTS ON THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE, available at http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/sanctions (last
visited Mar. 3, 2014).
178. Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2012).
“560.206 Prohibited trade-related transactions with Iran; goods, technology, or services.
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US persons and entities even abroad.179 The violation of sanctions
will have severe penalties including up to twenty years in prison and
up to US$1,000,000 in fines.180
The United Nation Security Council has passed multiple
resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In 2006, resolution
number 1696 basically urged Iran to conform to the Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty and re-engage itself with the international
community.181 This resolution demands Iran to “suspend all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and
development.”182 It expresses its intention to take further measures in
the case of non-compliance to persuade Iran to change its behavior.
Again in December 2006, the Security Council passed another
resolution concerning Iran’s nuclear program (Resolution number
1737).183 This Resolution prevents supply, sale, and transfer of “all
items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology which could
contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing and heavy waterrelated activities” of Iran.184 This broad provision does not specify the
criteria or the goods that might be employed in Iran’s nuclear
activities. Therefore, the decisions regarding the types of goods,
which fall under this resolution, could be subjective. Paragraph
(a) Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, and notwithstanding any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to May 7, 1995, no United States
person, wherever located, may engage in any transaction or dealing in or related to:
(1) Goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of
Iran; or
(2) Goods, technology, or services for exportation, re-exportation, sale or supply,
directly or indirectly, to Iran or the Government of Iran.
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the term transaction or dealing includes
but is not limited to purchasing, selling, transporting, swapping, brokering, approving,
financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing.” Id.
179. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14, 110 Stat. 1541
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note) (“(18) United States person. The term ‘United
States person’ means “(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States or who owes
permanent allegiance to the United States; and (B) a corporation or other legal entity which is
organized under the laws of the United States, any State or territory thereof, or the District of
Columbia, if natural persons described in subparagraph (A) own, directly or indirectly, more
than 50 percent of the outstanding capital stock or other beneficial interest in such legal entity.
”).
180. An Overview of Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations Involving Sanctions
against Iran, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.txt (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
181. See S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 2 U.N. Doc S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
182. Id.
183. S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006).
184. Id.
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Twelve talks about the freeze of funds, assets and economic
resources, which provide support to Iran’s proliferation. An exception
to this provision is Paragraph Fifteen, which declares, “measures in
Paragraph Twelve shall not prevent a designated person or entity from
making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing
of such person or entity”.185 Even in this case, the contract should
concern the materials, goods and assistance to Iran’s enrichment
activities.
Resolution 1747 (2007) does not entail significant general
sanctions. It requests a report from the Director General of the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) to make decisions regarding
the implementation of further sanctions.186 For the first time, it
explicitly names entities that are involved in nuclear or ballistic
missile activities.187 The resolution promises many incentives
including “improve[ement] of Iran’s access to the international
economy, market and capital” upon Iran’s change of behavior in its
nuclear program.188 In Resolution 1803 (2008), the United Nation
Security Council expands the measures in Resolution 1737 (2006) to
more entities enumerated in the Annexes of the Resolution.189 From
paragraphs nine to thirteen, it also calls upon all states, to “exercise
vigilance” for “public provided financial support for trade with
Iran.”190 This includes exports, financial services and other pertinent
services. Yet, this is a request for caution so that support and
investment do not “contribut[e] to the proliferation of sensitive
nuclear activities.”191 The latest resolution dates back to 2010
(Resolution number 1929).192 It confirms that Iran has failed to
comply with the requirement of IAEA.193 It asks the states to require
their nationals and legal entities to exercise full vigilance when it
comes to “doing business” with Iran.194 Furthermore, it calls upon
states “to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial
institutions”195 to open offices and subsidiaries or banking account in
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. ¶ 15.
S.C. Res. 1747, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
Id. at Annex 1.
Id.
See S.C. Res. 1803, Annex I, II, III U.N. Doc S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
Id. ¶¶ 9-13.
S.C. Res. 1803, ¶¶ 9-13 U.N. Doc S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
See S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 24.
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Iran if they have information that these activities will contribute to
Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.196 This Resolution
establishes a ‘Panel of Experts’ to monitor the implementation of
measures mentioned in Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803
(2008).197
The US Congress also passed multiple acts concerning Iran’s
sanctions. From the Carter presidency until the Obama administration,
sanctions have become increasingly all encompassing.198 Both
imports to and exports from Iran have become extremely legally
restrictive.199 Dealing in Iranian-origin goods by a US person is in
violation of US sanctions.200 Imports from Iran are limited to cases
such as gifts valued at $100.201 Exports to Iran, in the form of goods
or services, are also banned.202 Any new investment in any form
including funds and assets are prohibited.203 In certain cases, OFAC
(Office of Foreign Asset Control) may issue a license for a limited
period of time for a certain transaction.204 However, it seems that this
license might be issued for minor and personal-related investment.205
If even, under these sanctions, the US citizen knows or has reason to
know such items are intended specifically for supply, transshipment,
or re-expropriation to Iran, then he is subject to these sanctions as
well.206
As it is obvious, all the sanctions have made it extremely hard
for countries to invest in Iran. The sanctions have made direct

196. S.C. Res. 1929, ¶¶ 21-24 U.N. Doc S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).
197. Id. ¶ 29.
198. Year by year the US sanctions expanded on Iran. See Jason Starr & Heila Ighani,
Timeline of U.S. Sanctions, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER,
available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-sanctions .
199. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106387, §7207, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000).
200. See Iranian Transactions Regulations: Iranian-Origin Goods or Services; Goods or
Services Owned or Controlled by The Government of Iran, 31 C.F.R. § 560.306 (1999).
201. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.506 (1999).
202. Id. § 560.204
203. Id. § 560.207.
204. Licenses can be issued for exports, financial dealings with Iran, transactions as well
as for humanitarian causes. See An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations involving Sanctions
against Iran, DEP’T OF THE U.S. TREASURY (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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investment in Iran almost impossible (even though Iran is in dire need
of foreign investment, especially in its energy sector).207
The European Union is a latecomer in the area of international
sanctions in general and in the case of Iran as well.208 The European
Union realizes that the only major foreign policy tool it holds is
economic pressure.209 The European Union mainly enacts regulations
based on the UN Security Council resolutions.210 The main reason for
this is that the EU desires to avoid any inconsistencies as to the
interpretation given to the Security Council resolution by its
individual members.211 Furthermore, it is a faster process to
implement Security Council resolutions via the EU legislative
body.212
Western European Countries, in contract to the US, favored
diplomacy and negotiation for a significant amount of time. In 2007,
the first signs of standoff emerged.213 In a joint statement in 2007,
China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom showed
serious concern over Iran’s nuclear program and agreed to finalize a
text for a third UN sanction.214 In April of 2007, the Council
Regulation No 423/2007 was passed to provide a measure to
implement the UN Security Council 1737 (2006).215 In its annexes,
the Regulation declares the prohibited goods and lists persons and

207. Andrew Tochia, Iran Hopes for End of Sanctions Boom but Investors Still Wary,
REUTERS (June 25, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/25/us-iran-investmentanalysis-idUSKBN0F018820140625.
208. See Michael Brzoska, The Role of Sanctions in Non-Proliferation in ARMS
CONTROL, in THE 21ST CENTURY: BETWEEN COERCION AND COOPERATION 123, 132 (Oliver
Meier & Christopher Daase eds., 2013) (“The EU is a new actor in the field of sanctions.”).
For long, EU preferred to simply support the UN Sanctions in forms of EU regulations. See id.
However, under the pressure of the United States, EU started to implement regional sanctions
against Iran from March 2007 onwards. See id.
209. Anthonius W. de Vries & Hadewych Hazelzet, The EU as a New Actor on the
Sanctions Scene, in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM 95, 95 (Peter Wallensteen et al. eds., 2005).
210. See Brzoska, supra note 208.
211. See de Vries & Hazelzet, supra note 209, at 96.
212. Id. at 96.
213. Brzoska, supra note 208.
214. Joint Statement on Iran Sanctions, China-Fr.-Ger.-Russ.-U.K-U.S. (Sept. 28, 2007),
available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/eu-p6jointstatementoniran-092807.
pdf.
215. Council Regulation 423/2007, 2007 O.C. (L 103), available at http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/april/tradoc_134553.pdf (concerning restrictive measures
against Iran).
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entities subject to sanctions.216 Subsequently, the European Council
updated and amended the regulation and expanded the list of goods
and entities in the annexes.217 A few entities, including banks started
to fight back against the EU sanctions resulting in 30 cases in EU’s
General Court.218 Recently, the largest bank in Iran convinced the
Court to order its removal from the list.219 The General Court agreed
with Bank Saderat because there was not sufficient evidence proving
the involvement of Bank Saderat with Iran’s nuclear program.220
In sum, Iran is subject to sanctions at three levels: US
sanctions, which are the oldest of the three, UN sanctions, and EU
sanctions (which is basically an implementation of UN sanctions).
Each level of sanctions poses different and new challenges for arbitral
tribunals.
C. Sanctions as Justification for Withdrawal
As discussed earlier, the Islamic Republic of Iran is currently
the target of the toughest sanctions since the Islamic Revolution.221
Many multinational companies that mainly invested in the oil and gas
section have withdrawn their businesses due to the sanctions.222 It
seems that Iran has not yet initiated any litigation invoking the
arbitration clause in the bilateral investment treaties. Nevertheless, the
question is whether the Security Council, the EU, and the US
sanctions can exempt companies from fulfilling their obligations.
It is critical to distinguish between the national and
international sanctions. In our context, both domestic legislation and
the Security Council Resolutions affect the issue of investment in
Iran. The current trend believes that the principal governing legal

216. See id. at Annex II, III, IV.
217. Restrict Measures (Sanctions) in Force, EUROPEAN UNION (Feb. 9, 2014),
available at http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf (providing an updated
list of sanctioned entities and individuals).
218. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN ET AL., IRAN: SANCTIONS, ENERGY, ARMS CONTROL,
AND REGIME CHANGE 45-47 (2014).
219. See EU Court Rules for Second Time Against Iran Bank Sanctions, REUTERS (Feb.
6, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/06/us-iran-sanctions-eu-idUSBRE9151422
0130206.
220. Id.
221. See Timeline of U.S. Sanctions, supra note 198.
222. See Energy Firms to Quit Iran to Comply with US Sanctions, BBC (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11448952.
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order of investment disputes is international law.223 In international
law, there are certain norms, so-called jus cogens, which are nonderogable and can trump other conflicting treaties.224 Some scholars
posit that jus cogens norms are similar to mandatory rules in
investment disputes and are obligatory.225 Moreover, the Security
Council Resolutions are binding on member states regardless of other
treaty obligations countries might have undertaken.226 Therefore, if,
for example, the Security Council declares a resolution sanctioning an
individual’s assets because he/she is funding piracy, the host state in
which she invested should seize her assets regardless of its BIT
provisions.227
Conceptually, jus cogens norms are clearly laid out in the
Vienna Convention.228 Practically, however, it is not obvious which
norms fall under its category. As Reisman points out, “the only jus
cogens upon which the drafters of the Vienna Convention could agree
was the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter.”229 Hence, resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program and
the ensuing embargo hardly constitute any jus cogens norm, which
companies can resort to in the case of a breach.230 On the other hand,
223. See Ole Spiermann, Applicable Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 89, 102-07 (Peter Muchlinski ed., 2008).
224. Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 53. “A treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes
of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.” Id.
225. Donald Francis Donovan, Investment Treaty Arbitration, in MANDATORY RULES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 275, 278-79 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2011).
226. U.N. Charter art. 103. Article 103 of the UN Charter provides: “[i]n the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail.” Id.
227. Donovan, supra note 225.
228. See Vienna Convention, supra note 75, at art. 53. (“A treaty is void if, at the time of
its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”).
229. W. Michael Resiman, Report: Law, International Public Policy (So-called) and
Arbitral Choice in International Commercial Arbitration, 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 849,
855 (2007).
230. Several international law scholars and tribunals have been wary of separating jus
cogens and Security Council Resolutions so that the resolutions remain subject to jus cogens
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however, pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter, any inconsistent
treaty with the UN Charter is considered annulled.231 The Security
Council resolutions are issued under the authorization of Chapter
Seven of the UN Charter and possibly enjoy the same status as the
UN Charter.232 Thus, obligations arising out of the UN Charter,
especially those essential for the peace and security of the world
(Chapter Seven), are binding on all states.233
In the context of Iran’s foreign investment, for instance, a
company has to withdraw from performing its contractual obligation
upon knowledge that its business contributes technology to Iran’s
heavy water-related activities.234 The company can invoke Resolution
number 1737 of the UN Security Council, which prohibits transfer of
technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related
activities.235 On the other hand, however, invoking EU or US
sanctions, which are broader in scope, does not provide sufficient
grounds for a company to discontinue its contractual obligations with
Iran. Invoking US and EU sanctions is similar to invoking internal
laws for justification of breach. As discussed earlier, neither party can
resort to conflicting internal laws for the breach of a contract.236
D. Arbitral Review of Sanctions
Probably, the most important question for an arbitral tribunal
adjudicating an investment dispute involving sanctions would be the
extent of the reviewability of the sanctions. In other words, the issue
is whether an arbitral tribunal can assess and review international
sanctions. The United Nations Charter has strong language when
dealing with obligations arising under Security Council decisions.
norms. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-86 (1999); STUFYAN DROUBI,
RESISTING UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 34-38 (2014); Erika De Wet,
Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 541, 54-48 (2013).
231. U.N. Charter art. 103.
232. See ARTHUR WATTS & MICHAEL WOOD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
1999-2009: VOLUME IV: TREATIES, FINAL DRAFT ARTICLES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 749
(2011) (footnote omitted) (“Even if the primacy of Security Council decisions under Article
103 is not expressly spelled out in the Charter, it has been widely accepted in practice as well
as in doctrine.”).
233. Id.
234. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N., supra note 183, ¶ 3.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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Article 25 declares, “the Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter”.237 Article 103 also states “in the
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail.”238
The precedents in international tribunals, however, demonstrate
more flexibility when dealing with Security Council decisions.
Several decisions of International Court of Justice (ICJ) and European
Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments suggest that limited review is
allowable in international courts.239
The Security Council passed many resolutions entailing
different levels of sanctions especially after the Cold War.240 This
raised an issue as to whether sanctions ratified by the Security
Council are reviewable by the ICJ. This was one of the issues in two
ICJ cases, Lockerbie (1992) and Case Concerning the Application of
the Genocide Convention (1993).241 In the Lockerbie case, Libya
claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom are not
entitled to request extradition of the two accused Libyan citizens who
were involved in the Lockerbie event.242 The US and UK request was
based on Resolutions 731, 748 (1992) and Resolution 883 (1993),
demanding Libya to cooperate fully with the United Kingdom and the
United States in order to eradicate international terrorism.243 Libya’s
argument was that it did not have an extradition treaty with neither the
United Kingdom nor the United States.244 Libya also argued that
pursuant to the 1971 Montreal Convention it has jurisdiction to try the
237. U.N. Charter art. 25.
238. U.N. Charter art. 103.
239. See BYERS, supra note 230; De Wet, supra note 230; DROUBI, supra note 230; see
also Jose Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1-4 (1996).
240. See JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF
LAW 3 (2007).
241. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Ariel Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary
Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115; Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43.
242. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Ariel Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary
Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115, 128-29.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 130-31.
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accused Libyan citizens.245 The United Kingdom and the United
States raised preliminary objections stating, inter alia, that the ICJ
does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate because the relevant Security
Council Resolution trump rights arising out of the Montreal
Convention.246 They invoked Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter
as applicable provisions in the case.247 The Court, however, upheld its
jurisdiction because “Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and
883 (1993) were in fact adopted after the filing of the Application on
3 March 1992. In accordance with its established jurisprudence, if the
Court had jurisdiction on that date, it continues to do so.”248 In other
words, the Court did not accept the argument that Security Council
Resolutions can supersede the international convention, as a jus cogen
norm would under similar circumstances.
Judge Schwebel, who was the president of the court at the
time, wrote a dissenting opinion. He posited that the court lacks the
power to review the decisions of the Security Council and cannot
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and to decide upon responsive measures to
be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.”249
One of his main arguments was that the Security Council could not be
a party to the proceeding, which “would run counter to fundamental
juridical principles.”250
In the Case Concerning the Application of the Genocide
Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina) the Court also addressed the
issue of the reviewability of Security Council decisions vis-à-vis
states’ rights.251 In this case, the issue was whether the Security
Council Resolution dictating arms embargo on Bosnia is reviewable
245. Id. at 12-13. ("The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (23 September 1971). Article 5 (2) declares that “Each Contracting
State shall likewise take such measures as necessary to establish jurisdiction over offenses
mentioned . . . in case where alleged offender is present in its territory ad it does not extradite
him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned.”
246. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Ariel Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary
Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115, 10-11.
247. Id. at 17-18.
248. Id.
249. Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), 1998 I.C.J. 155, 68-69
(Schwebel, Pres., dissenting).
250. Id. at 61.
251. Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 63.
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considering the fact that the resolution has a potentially negative
impact on Bosnia’s right to self-defense.252 The Court declared that
the right to self-defense should not be impaired by the Security
Council decision:
“That Security Council resolution 713 (1991), imposing a
weapons embargo upon the former Yugoslavia, must be construed in
a manner that shall not impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the terms of
United Nations Charter Article 51 and the rules of customary
international law.”253
These two cases clearly show that reviewability of
international sanctions imposed by the Security Council is possible at
least in a limited way. As John Dugard posits “total rejection of
judicial review is unlikely to prevail.”254 There is also a recent highly
controversial case that was litigated before the European Court of
Justice. The so-called Kadi judgment was very provocative in the area
of human rights and the Security Council decisions.255 It involves a
Security Council Decision, which identifies Kadi as one of the
supporters of Al-Qaeda and, henceforth, subject to the imposed
sanctions. The decision was followed by several Security Council
Resolutions ordering the freeze of assets of individuals and entities
associated with Al-Qaeda as determined by the Sanction Committee
of the Security Council.256 Following the decision of the Sanctions
Committee, the Council of Europe adopted Regulation 881/2002
containing a list of individuals and entities including Kadi and the Al
Barakaat International Foundation.257 Kadi disputed the appearance of
his name and his company on the sanctions list and brought a case in
the Court of First Instance to challenge the regulation.258 Mr. Kadi
argued, inter alia, that his right to judicial review, his right to
property and the principle of proportionality were violated in the
252.
253.
Genocide
1993).
254.

Id.
Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 3, 6 (Apr. 8,

John Dugard, Judicial Review of Sanctions, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001).
255. Eur. Comm’n and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 P. C593/10 P & C-595/10 P, [2008] ECR I–6351.
256. TERRORISM: COMMENTARY ON SECURITY DOCUMENTS, VOL 122: U.N. RESPONSE
TO AL QAEDA DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH 2011 13, 15 (Kristen Boon et al. eds., 2012).
257. Id.
258. Eur. Comm’n and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, [2008] ECR I–6351 ¶ 46.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (Vera

1780 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1731
case.259 The case also dealt with the supremacy of the Security
Council Resolution over the EU law. The Court accepted the
argument of Mr. Kadi with regards to the infringement of his
fundamental rights. It concluded that the court should ensure the
review of observance of the fundamental rights as stipulated by the
European Community.260 In a subtle way, the Court argued that
reviewing the Community measure based on the Security Council
measure did not amount to challenging the content and the primacy of
the resolution itself.261 The European Community, according to the
Court, should take into account the object and purpose of the
decisions of the Security Council but the implementation is still
within the scope of domestic legal systems.262 Pursuant to the Court’s
reasoning, the mere fact that a regulation is based on the Security
Council Resolution does not immune it to review especially from the
human rights perspective.263
It was not until the post-Cold War era that the international
courts had to seriously grapple with the issue of the reviewability of
international sanctions.264 Yet, the decisions discussed above
demonstrate that international courts have limited power to review

259. Id. ¶ 49.
260. Id. ¶ 326.
261. Id. “It must however be noted that the Charter of the United Nations does not
impose the choice of a particular model for the implementation of resolutions adopted by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, since they are to be given effect in
accordance with the procedure applicable in that respect in the domestic legal order of each
Member of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations leaves the Members of the
United Nations a free choice among the various possible models for transposition of those
resolutions into their domestic legal order.” Id. ¶ 298.
262. Id. ¶¶ 228, 256, 283, 284.
263. Id. European Court of Human Rights did not recognize the power of revieability in
the context of international peacekeeping operations in Behrami and Behrami v. France and
Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway cases. The court found that the court should not
interfere with the fulfillment of the restoration of peace measures as established and conducted
by the United Nation Security Council (Behrami and Behrami v. France Application No.
71412/01 and Saramati v. France, Germany And Norway Application No. 78166/01 ¶ 149).
However, the ECrHR distinguishes between this case and an earlier case, Bosphorus. The
Court declares unlike the present case, there was a link between the action and the respondent
state. Henceforth, in the Bosphorus case, the Court found the claim admissible as to the seizure
of assets even though it was EC Council Regulation based on US Security Council: “The
Court did not therefore consider that any question arose as to its competence, notably ratione
personae, vis-à-vis the respondent State despite the fact that the source of the impugned
seizure was an EC Council Regulation which, in turn, applied a UNSC Resolution.” Id. ¶ 151.
264. FARRALL, supra note 240.
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international sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.265 The
Courts’ judgments confirm that the very nature of the restoration of
peace and order in international relations has been delegated to the
Security Council and is not subject to review. However, the
implementation of the sanctions especially vis-à-vis fundamental
rights is reviewable.266
The question is whether an arbitral tribunal, constituted
pursuant to bilateral investment treaties or other documents, can
review international sanctions. Different types of international
sanctions can be viewed in the following table:

National Sanctions

International
Sanctions (UN
Security Council)

Individual Sanctions

General Sanctions

Broad Review (no
justification for
breach)

Broad Review (no
justification for
breach)

Limited Review
(correspondence of
regulation imposing
sanctions)

Broad Review
(legality of sanctions
as applied)

This table briefly describes the different scenarios when
international sanctions enter into the scene of international arbitration
and the potential outcomes. The first relevant distinction is whether
the source of an international sanction at question is internal or
international. As discussed in the previous section,267 invoking
internal laws is generally not a valid argument in the context of
international disputes. In other words, one party cannot resort to its

265. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Ariel Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary
Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115; Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43.
266. Id.; Alvarez, supra note 239; BYERS, supra note 230; DROUBI, supra note 230; De
Wet, supra note 230.
267. See supra Part III.C.
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internal laws for justification of its breach of international
obligations.268
The status of international sanctions imposed by the Security
Council is more challenging. If the Security Council specifically
names an individual, a company or an entity, the arbitral tribunal does
not have much room to review. In this case, similar to the Kadi and
Bosphorus cases, the arbitral tribunal could review the internal
regulation ratified pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution.
The review in this scenario is restricted to ensuring that the internal
regulation corresponds fully with the Security Council Resolution. On
the other hand, if the Security Council Resolution has a broad
language, as commonly is the case, the arbitral tribunal could hear
arguments regarding the application of the Resolution. Borrowing
from US Constitutional language, in this scenario the arbitral tribunal
can review the UN sanctions “as applied” in the case before it.
Evidently it does not have the power to rule on the “legality” (similar
to “constitutionality” in US constitutional law) of international
sanctions.269
Expanding the power of the reviewability of arbitral tribunals
will ensure greater compliance as well as fairness when dealing with
international sanctions. Even minor power of reviewability will create
stronger legitimacy and, henceforth, more effectiveness. Jose Alvarez,
who is among a few scholars who discussed this issue in the context
of ICJ, stipulates the same possibility for arbitral tribunals. 270 In a
footnote, he posits that the private right of actions should not be
barred solely based on the existence of a Security Council decision.271
The underlying policy is that “termination of such private rights of
268. See generally George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International
Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012) (explaining that internal laws can have
some effects on “gateway” issues such as consent to international arbitration).
269. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (“It is true that when, if ever,
the provisions set forth in the ordinance in tedious and minute detail, come to be concretely
applied to particular premises, including those of the appellee, or to particular conditions, or to
be considered in connection with specific complaints, some of them, or even many of them,
may be found to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.”). See generally Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
270. Alvarez, supra note 239 (contrasting two approaches to judicial review of Security
Council decisions: realpolitik approach which argues that UN Charter is not a constitution and
Security Council Decisions are not reviewable under any circumstance. The other side of the
spectrum is those who are inspired by Marbury v. Madison decision and believe in the judicial
reviewability over Security Council action. He concludes that judicial review is evolving in
international law and reaching different modes of judicial review is possible).
271. Id. at 12.
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action goes beyond protecting the Council’s supremacy…absent
remedial action by the Council, individual may have no remedy even
when a state has applied the sanction too broadly, to the detriment of
contractual or other rights.”272
CONCLUSION
International investment law grew significantly since the end of
the Cold War, as did the international sanctions regimes designed to
change the behavior of recalcitrant states. Yet, inevitably, the
overreaching scope of both regimes resulted in a clash between the
two, creating unprecedented legal challenges. There has not been
thorough research on the interplay of these two regimes. This piece is
the first attempt to analyze this complex matter employing Iran an
example. Iran has been subject to a web of economic sanctions,
unparalleled in history. Yet, there is a new revival of interest in
investment in Iran due to the recent thaw between Iran and the
Western Countries.
The new nuclear deal with Iran has refreshed many thorny legal
issues pertaining to investing in Iran. The complex regime of
sanctions, Iran’s unfavorable constitutional provisions and numerous
investment treaties are all at play when it comes to investment in Iran.
The effect of economic sanctions on potential investments in Iran
poses the most complex challenge to the business community. On the
other hand, hurdles related to Iran’s constitution worry companies as
to lack of sufficient protection. Conversely, a multitude of modern
investment treaties Iran has concluded brings about international
responsibility to the Iranian Government to provide protection for
investment. These three dimensions (i.e. economic sanctions,
constitutional hurdles, investment treaties) have created
unprecedented questions, which this article tried to answer. By
referring to Iran’s example, this article specifically placed the clash
between investment and economic sanctions under careful
examination.
There is no doubt that economic sanctions, along with domestic
legal obstacles in Iran’s legal system, are major hindrances to foreign
investment in Iran. One should bear in mind, however, that in the past
two decades the Islamic Republic of Iran has enjoyed tremendous
investment in its gas and oil industry as well as others. These
272. Id.

1784 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1731
investments primarily occurred in the period when Iran was seeking
reconciliation with the West from 1997 to 2003.273 In the meantime,
Iran concluded many bilateral investment treaties with different
countries. These BITs, especially arbitration clauses, are becoming
more important due to increasing interest in investment in Iran.
The BITs Iran has signed with different countries are generally
progressive. All of them have arbitration clauses, which can
adjudicate the cases based on either ICC rules or ad hoc rules they
design.274 Iran is also a member of the New York Convention,
meaning that arbitral awards will be enforceable in Iran.275
Furthermore, national laws in Iran recognize arbitral awards as an
alternative method for local courts upon parties’ consent.276 All BITs
have stipulated compensation in cases of nationalization and
expropriation.277 Henceforth, although Iranian BITs are not as
comprehensive as, for example, US BITs, they include all of the
major elements.278 If at any point Iran becomes a member of the
ICSID, pursuant to some of its BITs, the potential disputes could be
referred to the ICSID as well.279
Generally speaking, the BITs Iran has concluded in the period
between 1995 to 2007 will sooner or later be the platform from which
arbitration cases arise. In other words, these BITs furnish a
convenient alternative for Iran’s national courts. Furthermore, it
seems that neither the conflicting domestic national provisions of Iran
nor the majority of sanctions will affect potential arbitration
proceedings. The international sanctions, including UN Sanctions, do
not elevate to the status of jus cogens norms, and thus are not
preemptory.280 On the other hand, the precedents in international
courts including the International Court of Justice, European Court of
Justice, and European Court of Human rights demonstrate the
possibility of review of international sanctions. US and EU sanctions
273. Energy and the Iranian Economy: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 109th
Cong. 48 (2006).
274. Id.; see also supra Part I.D.
275. New York Convention, supra note 70.
276. See Qanuni Davari Tejari Beinolmelal, supra note 69; Aini Dadrasii Madani, supra
note 69.
277. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2005, art. 9 (Iran); Iranian
Model BIT, art. 6.
278. Supra Part 1.B.
279. Atai, supra note 62.
280. See Alvarez, supra note 239; BYERS, supra note 230; De Wet, supra note 230;
DROUBI, supra note 230.
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cannot trump international obligations of companies and other
states.281 UN Sanctions are also subject to arbitral review to the extent
that they address the issues of applicability and implementation of the
sanctions.282 The arbitral tribunals can review international sanctions
in line with the object and purpose of bilateral or multilateral
investment treaties. The mere fact of prima facie existence and the
applicability of the UN sanctions do not preclude arbitral tribunals to
review and adjudicate the relevance and implementation of the UN
sanctions.
It is highly unlikely that the business community will hold from
investing in Iran considering the new rapprochement, despite
Obama’s warning about sanctions. The companies might enter Iran
through shell companies in order to avoid being directly subject to US
sanctions. On the other hand, Iran has become part of the international
investment regime, which, as described, to a great extent might
attenuate the effect of economic sanctions. The international
investment regime might serve as a platform for an unintended
consequence, and that is combatting economic sanctions.

281. Supra notes 230, 239 and accompanying text.
282. Supra notes 230, 239 and accompanying text.
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